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ARRIAN AND THE ALANI

A. B. BOSWORTH

IN modern times L. Flavius Arrianus is best known as the historian par excellence of Alexander the Great. He was also one of the most prominent figures of the Hadrianic era, a friend of the emperor and consular legate of Cappadocia between A.D. 131 and 137.¹ While in Cappadocia he successfully repelled an incursion by a marauding Sarmatian people, the Alani. The encounter is unusually well documented by Arrian himself. The extant *Order of Battle against the Alani* ("Ἑκταξίς κατὰ Ἀλανῶν") describes in some detail the disposition and tactics he intended to use to counter the massed heavy cavalry of the enemy.² The *Ectaxis* itself is an invaluable quarry of information for students of the Roman army, and the data it supplies about the auxiliary forces of Cappadocia have long been appreciated as unique. Arrian's dual role as Roman general and Greek historian has also attracted attention; rightly so, for he provides one of the most spectacular instances of the assimilation of the Hellenic provincial aristocracy into

This essay was originally delivered in April 1975 as a James C. Loeb Classical Lecture and seminar at Harvard University. I am glad to acknowledge the stimulating suggestions made by the audience both then and later, and I owe a particular debt to Professors E. Badian, G. W. Bowersock, M. Raschke, and P. A. Stadter. Any errors that may remain are of course my own responsibility.

¹ See in general E. Schwartz, *RE* II 1230-1237; H. F. Pelham, "Arrian as Legate of Cappadocia," *Essays in Roman History* (Oxford 1909) 212-233; A. Stein, *PIR*² F 219; E. Bowie, *Past and Present* XLVI (1970) 24-28; A. B. Bosworth, "Arrian and Rome," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* II 4.

² I refer to the text in the second edition of A. G. Roos' Teubner of Arrian (*II: Scripta Minora* [Leipzig 1968] 177-185). In summer 1975 I made my own examination of the archetype of the *Ectaxis* (Plut. gr. 55.4), which is kept in the Medicean Library, and I confirmed the accuracy of Roos' readings. All manuscript errors are reported in his apparatus; he fails to mention three insignificant spaces in the text which mark the end of sentences, but otherwise his description of the state of the manuscript seems exhaustive. There is also a text in F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* II B 851-854 (*FGrH* 156 F 12), but it is based on the 1885 Teubner edition of A. Eberhard and includes some emendations which are certainly incorrect. The recent English translation by B. H. Bachrach, *A History of the Alans in the West* (Minnesota 1973) 126-132, is riddled with errors and useless for historical interpretation.

governing circles at Rome. It comes as a surprise to find that there is as yet no detailed study of the historical background to Arrian's encounter with the Alani, no attempt to elucidate the long and short range problems with which Arrian was faced.³ The present paper is an attempt to fill that gap and in particular to place the *Ectaxis* in the light it deserves. As a general's report on an actual campaign, this work on its smaller scale has an importance comparable to Caesar's *Commentarii*, and like the *Commentarii* it poses intriguing historiographical problems. In what follows I shall first attempt to sketch the wider political setting of Arrian's encounter with the Alani, then I shall move to the detailed tactical narrative of the *Ectaxis*, and finally I shall deal with some of the more remarkable aspects of its literary presentation.

Almost all our information about Arrian's encounter with the Alani is provided by Arrian's fellow countryman, Cassius Dio of Nicaea. The passage in question survives only in epitome, but it exists in three versions, those of Xiphilinus, Zonaras, and the Byzantine *excerpta de legationibus*.⁴ These versions agree in factual content and vocabulary, and the composite text printed by Boissevain is probably a fair approximation of what Dio actually wrote. Though brief the passage is extremely informative. In the first place the war against the Alani is synchronized with the suppression of Bar Kochba's rebellion in Judaea. This uprising ended in the 18th regnal year of Hadrian, probably in summer 135.⁵ So

³ Pelham's essay (see n.1, above) is the fullest study, but it concentrates largely on the *Periplus*, relegating the Alani to the last few pages and dealing almost exclusively with the composition of Arrian's army. There are passing remarks on the political background by N. C. Debevoise, *A Political History of Parthia* (Chicago 1938) 242–244; D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (Princeton 1950) I 621, II 1483; F. Carrata Thomes, *Gli Alani nella politica orientale di Antonino Pio* (Università di Torino: Pubbl. d. Fac. d. Lett. e Filos. X 2 [1958]).

⁴ Dio 69.15.1 (T 12 Roos) ὁ μὲν οὖν τῶν Ἰουδαίων πόλεμος ἐς τοῦτο ἐτελεύτησεν, ἕτερος δὲ ἐξ Ἀλανῶν (εἰοὶ δὲ Μασσαγέται) ἐκινήθη ὑπὸ Φαρασαίου, καὶ τὴν μὲν Ἀλβανίδα καὶ τὴν Μηδίαν ἰσχυρῶς ἐλύπησε, τῆς δ' Ἀρμενίας τῆς τε Καππαδοκίας ἀνήμενος, ἔπειτα τῶν Ἀλανῶν τὰ μὲν δώροις ὑπὸ τοῦ Οὐλολογαίσου πεισθέντων, τὰ δὲ καὶ Φλάουιον Ἀρριανὸν τὸν τῆς Καππαδοκίας ἀρχοντα φοβηθέντων, ἐπαύσατο. The text is taken from Xiphilinus and the *excerpta*, which agree verbatim except that Albania is mentioned in the *excerpta* alone. Zonaras 11.24 gives a briefer résumé, not mentioning Arrian and conflating the Alani and Albani, but the vocabulary he uses is identical with that of the other digests and must derive from Dio.

⁵ Eusebius *HE* 4.6.3 gives the regnal year, which seems confirmed by the fact that Hadrian's second imperial salutation, conferred at the end of the Jewish War, is missing in diplomas of 134 (*CIL* XVI 78–80). Hostilities may have dragged out until the end of the year. The last dated document of the revolt was written on “21 Tishri of the fourth year of the liberation of Israel”; if war broke out in spring 132, that would take us to October 135. See, most recently, E. Schürer, *A History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ* (2nd ed., 1972) 553.

far the dating is very rough and ready, but at least it coheres with the evidence of Arrian's *Periplus*. This work was written in 131/132, immediately after the death of King Cotys II of the Bosphorus.⁶ Now the *Periplus* has an overt and practical purpose, to inform Hadrian of conditions in the Black Sea area in case he decided upon an expedition to the Crimea to settle the affairs of the Bosporan kingdom (*Periplus* 17.3). There is, however, not a word about the Alani. Arrian says nothing about the peoples in the hinterland of the Tanais and Lake Maeotis, the domicile of the Alani, although he is scrupulous to enumerate the inland tribes immediately to the south.⁷ The omission of the Alani is startling and virtually incomprehensible if they had already begun to pose a threat to Roman Cappadocia. Dio's date of 135 seems roughly correct for the war.

The account of the invasion proper is also extremely informative. It is clear that the Alani did not move spontaneously but at the instigation of Pharasmanes II, king of Iberia. Now the kingdom of Iberia was placed in a crucial strategic position. It dominated the Caucasus, controlling the key Pass of Darial, which straddles the main road from north to south of the range.⁸ Pharasmanes allowed the Alani through his kingdom so that they could devastate the neighboring states of Albania and Media Atropatene. In other words, the invasion was directed against areas outside the Roman Empire. The territory which suffered most in it was the Parthian vassal kingdom of Media. It is true that the Alani subsequently moved into the Roman domains of Armenia and Cappadocia,⁹ but they were already sated with plunder and the Danegeld

⁶ The coinage of Cotys II covers years 420–429 of the Bosporan era, equivalent to 123/124–132/133. His successor, Rhoemetalcus, was already issuing coins in year 428 (131/132). Cf. B. M. C. *Pontus etc.* 61–64; *PIR*² I 276, 516.

⁷ Arr. *Peripl.* 11.1–3. The description of the Tanais and Lake Maeotis comes at 19.1–3. Arrian says nothing about the peoples there, which contrasts sharply with the previous chapter, where he gives the precise boundary between the Zilchi and Sanigae, minor client tribes at the extremity of Cappadocia (18.3) The Alani were immediately to the northeast of the Zilchi, yet they are not mentioned.

⁸ On the importance of the Darial Pass see particularly Pliny *NH* 6.40 with Treidler, *RE* XXII 325–326.

⁹ A. von Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans* (Tübingen 1885) 146–147, claimed that the Volgaesians who bought off the Alani and sent embassies of complaint to Rome was not the Parthian king but the unknown ruler of Armenia appointed by Hadrian in 114 (*HA Hadr.* 21.11). This view has often been accepted (cf. Magie, *RRAM* II 1528), but wrongly. Gutschmid had no reason other than prejudice for denying that the Parthian king could have bought off the Alani or complained against Pharasmanes, and there is no reason why the ruler of Armenia should be substituted for him.

weakly paid by Vologaeses II of Parthia to induce them to move west. The momentum of the Alani seems to have been spent by then. The war says Dio, merely touched (*ἠψάμενος*) Armenia and Cappadocia, for the Alani were frightened off by Flavius Arrianus. Dio's terminology does not indicate a very serious campaign in Cappadocia, more a demonstration of force near the frontier to divert the raiders north to the Caucasus. We should certainly be very wary of talking in terms of a full scale invasion of Cappadocia and a major threat to the frontier system of the Roman east.

It is questionable whether the Alani ever posed a serious frontier problem for the Romans. Their previous history, in so far as it is known, suggests that their depredations in general served the interests of Rome. In the first decades of the Christian era the Alani made their appearance in the lower Don basin. From their original homeland in the lower reaches of the Oxus south of the Sea of Aral they had wandered slowly westwards to the river Don and the Sea of Azov. There they displaced two earlier arrivals, the Aorsi and Sindaces, both Sarmatian peoples who had themselves migrated and reached South Russia by the mid-first century B.C.¹⁰ Formidable these peoples certainly were. Their warriors were the famous mailed cavalry which had evolved among the Saca peoples south of the Aral as early as Achaemenid times. In the main, however, they had no contact with Rome in their early days in South Russia. When they appear in history, it tends to be as mercenaries in the service of neighboring kings. As early as 48 B.C. Pharnaces of Pontus had used vast numbers of Sarmatian cavalry in his grandiose invasion of Asia Minor.¹¹ On this occasion they did attack Rome, but as auxiliaries not as the principal agents, and there is no hint that they played a decisive role in the hostilities. Later under Augustus there were embassies from the Sarmatian kings in and beyond the Don basin,

¹⁰ On the Sarmatian migration to the west see G. Vernadsky, "Sur l'origine des Alains," *Byzantion* 16 (1942/1943) 81-86, and, most accessibly, T. Sulimirski, *The Sarmatians* (1971) 112 ff. A substantial branch of the Alani seem to have remained in the eastern steppes. They are named in the annals of the Han dynasty of China, dating from the first two centuries A.D., and Ptolemy apparently places them in the far east as well as in Europe (Ptol. 3.5.19; 6.14.9; cf. Täubler, *Klio* 9 [1909] 19-20; K. Enoki, *Central Asiatic Journal* 1 [1955] 46-50). To this day a small Turcoman tribe in the basin of the Amu-Darya (Oxus) calls itself the Alani (Vernadsky, p. 82).

¹¹ Strabo 11.5.8 (506). The numbers given are formidable, 20,000 Siracian cavalry and still more Aorsi, but they are unique to Strabo. No other source hints that the Sarmatians played any important role in the invasion. See further Magie, *RRAM* I 407-412.

soliciting the friendship of the Roman people.¹² The identity of these Sarmatian kings is not stated, but they must have included the Aorsi and Sindaces, who occupied the Don basin in Augustus' reign. The Alani proper had not yet arrived.

The Sarmatian forerunners of the Alani were *amici populi Romani* as early as Augustus' reign. The Alani also make their first appearance in Roman history as allies of Rome. In A.D. 35 Tiberius launched a military and diplomatic offensive against the Parthian king, Artabanus III, who had recently seized Armenia. Rome's military offensive was operated from the north; the king of Iberia led an invasion into Armenia.¹³ Both sides, Parthian and Iberian, called upon the Sarmatians as allies, but it was the Iberians who controlled the passes across the Caucasus and were able to admit their own allies, at the same time excluding help for the Parthians.¹⁴ Thanks to the Sarmatian heavy cavalry the Parthians were decisively defeated and Armenia returned to the political fold of Rome — under an Iberian king. Who were these Sarmatians? Tacitus, the principal source, speaks vaguely of *Sarmatae* without specifying their origins. Josephus, however, names them explicitly as Alani. The passage is admittedly slightly corrupt, but the reference to the Alani is clear enough.¹⁵ We must accept that they were instrumental in a major Roman triumph.

¹² *Res Gestae* 31.2: nostram amic[iti]am appetive[re] run[t] per legat[os] B[a]starn[ae] Scythae[que] et Sarmatarum qui su[n]t citra fl[um]en Tanaim [et] ultra reg[es] Alba[norum]que rex et Hiberorum e[st] Medorum]. For the location of the Aorsi along the Tanais see Strabo 11.5.8 (506).

¹³ Tac. *Ann.* 6.32–36; Dio 58.26.1–4 (very brief); cf. Debevoise (above, n.3) 158–159.

¹⁴ Tac. *Ann.* 6.33.2: contra Pharasmanes adiungere Albanos, accire Sarmatas, quorum sceptuchi utrimque donis acceptis more gentico diversa induere. sed Hiberi locorum potentes Caspia via Sarmatam in Armenios raptim effundunt.

¹⁵ Jos. *Ag.* 18.97: after Tiberius' appeal to the kings of Iberia and Albania, οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ μὲν ἀντειχόν, Ἄλανοι δὲ διόδον αὐτοῖς διδόντες διὰ τῆς αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς θύρας τὰς Κασπίας ἀνοίξαντες ἐπάγουσι τῷ Ἀρταβάνῳ. This, the manuscript reading, is untenable. The Alani cannot have given the Iberians passage through the Caspian Gates, for the gates were in Iberian territory. Tacitus, moreover, says explicitly that it was the Iberians who admitted their allies through the Caspian Gates. The *editio princeps* was therefore right to emend to Ἀλανοὺς, assuming the word to have been attracted by its context into the nominative. It is clear that Josephus named the Alani as allies of the Iberians at this juncture, and it is generally accepted that the Alani had reached the Tanais by A.D. 35 (M. Rostovtzeff, *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* [1922] 116; *CAH.* 11.94). Täubler (above, n.10) 16 observed acutely that late in Claudius' reign the Siraces were adjacent to the Dandarii, near the Kuban River and three days march from the Don (Tac. *Ann.* 12.16–17.2). Strabo, however, had located them south of the

The subsequent references to Alani in particular and Sarmatians in general are extremely scanty. Towards the end of Claudius' reign there was trouble in the Bosporan kingdom, when the exiled king Mithridates tried to regain the throne from his nephew, Cotys I.¹⁶ On this occasion Sarmatian peoples took both sides.¹⁷ The Alani are not mentioned, but the decisive action was taken by the king of the cognate Aorsi, who first helped Cotys to victory and then negotiated with Claudius as an equal on behalf of Mithridates, the defeated party.¹⁸ The episode shows clearly that the Sarmatians were a potent force in Bosporan politics, and the client kingdom of the Bosphorus was clearly subject to chronic attacks by the Sindaces.¹⁹ But there was as yet no Sarmatian unity, and the tribes could be successfully played off against each other.

The Alani did not become predominant in the area until the Neronian period. They are apparently unknown in Latin literature until Lucan, who speaks of them as a bellicose people beyond the Caspian Gates.²⁰ Subsequently Valerius Flaccus and Martial portray them as the principal Sarmatian people of South Russia.²¹ The reason for their sudden prominence is unknown, and speculation cannot take us far. The early 60s A.D. however, do seem to have witnessed increased Roman activity around the Black Sea. The legate of Moesia, Ti. Plautius Silvanus Aelianus, penetrated to the Bosporan kingdom and raised a siege by the formidable Tauroscythians of the Crimea.²² In the aftermath of this expedition there was apparently direct Roman intervention. At least

Aorsi, below the Tanais and abutting the Caucasian mountains (11.2.1 [492]; 11.5.7 [506]). In the first half of the first century the Siraces had been pushed to the north, and the most probable explanation is that the arrival of the Alani had forced them to migrate.

¹⁶ Tac. *Ann.* 12.15–18; Pliny *NH* 6.17.

¹⁷ Tac. *Ann.* 12.15.3.

¹⁸ Tac. *Ann.* 12.16–17 gives details of the campaign, on which see Treidler, *RE* IX A 1092–1093. For the Aorsian claim to equality see Tac. *Ann.* 12.19.2.

¹⁹ Tac. *Ann.* 12.15.2: *hostilia resumpserat*. The Siraces apparently remained a nuisance for the next century. An inscription of A.D. 193 honors a Bosporan dignitary who gained his laurels *πολλ[ε]μήσας . . . καὶ Σιραχῶν καὶ Σκύθας* (Latschew, *IPE* II 423). The Sarmatian peoples, however, never seem to have presented the consistent threat against the Bosporan kingdom that their Scythian neighbors did (Rostovtzeff, *CAH*. XI 95–96).

²⁰ Lucan 8.223–224; 10.454; cf. Täubler (above, n.10) 14.

²¹ Val. Flacc. 6.42, 656; Martial 7.30. Seneca *Thyestes* 629–630 refers to the Alani, but confusedly locates them near the Danube.

²² *ILS* 986. The epitaph explicitly distinguishes the Scyths who attacked the Tauric Chersonese from the Sarmatian peoples near the Danube. For further details see V. F. Gajdukevič, *Das bosporanische Reich* (Berlin 1971) 344–345.

Nero's head and titulature appears alone on the coinage after 62/63, displacing the monogram of the local ruler, Cotys I.²³ The Alani themselves are not mentioned in these transactions, but as Roman attention gradually focused on the northern Black Sea coast, it is hardly surprising that they became familiar as the most important Sarmatian people north of the Caucasus.

It was the invasion of 72, however, which made the Alani a household word. In that year they invaded Parthian territory at the invitation of the insurgent Hyrcanians. They swept round the Caspian in a vast arc, passing near their old homeland south of the Aral Sea and burst through the eastern Caspian Gates, some fifty miles east of modern Teheran.²⁴ The first victims were the unfortunate people of Media Atropatene, who were taken entirely by surprise and could offer no resistance. The wives and concubines of King Pacorus fell into their hands, and he was forced to pay a ransom of 100 talents. The wave of invasion then moved to Armenia, where King Tiridates, newly installed with Nero's consent, was rash enough to risk battle. He was defeated, almost captured alive, thanks to the invaders' dexterity with the lasso, and he had to watch helplessly while the invaders returned home, presumably through the passes controlled by Iberia, laden with immense booty from the two stricken kingdoms. It had been a devastating raid, but a raid wholly directed against Parthia, and it was the Parthian king whose prestige suffered, for two of his brothers had been humiliated by the invaders.²⁵

²³ B. M. C. *Pontus* 47; cf. Stein, *PIR*² C 1556; E. H. Minns, *Scythians and Greeks* (1913) 599 f; J. C. G. Anderson, *CAH*. X 775-776; Gajdukevič (above, n.22) 345-347.

²⁴ The only informative account is that of Josephus *BJ* 7.244-251, where the invasion is placed immediately after the annexation of Commagene, dated exactly to 72 (*BJ* 7.219). The circuit of the Caspian involved a vast detour, and it has been thought that Josephus is confused, either mistaking the Caspian Gates for the Pass of Derbend (Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans* 133; a view shared by Mommsen and repeated by A. R. Anderson, *TAPA* 59 [1928] 147-148), or mistaking the Alani of the Tanais for their eastern relatives (Täubler [above, n.10] 18-20). But Josephus' narrative is detailed and plausible. He states that the Medes were taken entirely by surprise (7.246), and it is perfectly possible that the Alani circled the Caspian. For most of the way they would have traveled through the territory of related tribes, and the first part of the Parthian empire they encountered was the land of their allies, the Hyrcanians. That gave the onslaught the value of complete surprise, which would have been lost had they approached through the Caucasus.

²⁵ For the importance Vologaeses attached to the success of his two brothers in their dependent kingdoms see Tac. *Ann.* 15.2 and for his concern to maintain their *dignitas* Tac. *Ann.* 15.31.

The Alani had scrupulously avoided the Roman provinces of Asia Minor, and, not surprisingly, Vespasian refused the desperate appeal of Vologaeses for a joint expedition.²⁶ This was a logical if unfriendly act. It was hardly in the interests of Rome to destroy such a useful weapon against Parthia. Of course it was a possibility that the Alani might attack Roman Asia Minor, but their past history had been of friendship with Rome, and the fear of attack must have been slight. Indeed the movement of 135 is the first known incursion by the Alani upon Roman territory. It had been shown in the past that when the Alani moved they had either been instigated or invited by interested powers, and, as long as the Romans could control or exert control over the Caucasian passes there was little to fear from them. But in the center of the Caucasus was the kingdom of Iberia, and it was Pharasmanes of Iberia who fomented the invasion of 135. All strands of the argument are leading in the same direction, and clearly the next stage must be the examination of relations between Rome and Iberia.

The kingdom of Iberia lay in the heart of the Caucasus. Its center lay in the upper reaches of the Cyrus river, not far from modern Tiflis and immediately south of the crucial Darial Pass.²⁷ To the west the confines of the kingdom extended nearly to Colchis and the Black Sea coast. In 65 B.C. Pompey was able to cross directly from Iberia to the river Phasis and the Black Sea.²⁸ Similarly Arrian in the *Periplus* describes the Zydreitae, a people of the inland mountains immediately south of the Phasis, and observes that they were vassals of Pharasmanes of Iberia.²⁹ For two hundred years and more the kingdom had formed a vastly important strategic bridge from the Roman controlled Pontus to the Parthian dependency of Media Atropatene. Between Parthian Media and Iberia stood the kingdom of Albania, which had its center in the lower Araxes plain. To the south was the fertile Caspian coast, leading into Media, and to the north the Derbend Pass which dominates the sea road

²⁶ Suet. *Dom.* 2.2; Dio 66.15.3; εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐ προσήκει αὐτῷ τὰ ἀλλότρια πολυπραγμονεῖν.

²⁷ The most helpful ancient description of the area is that of Strabo 11.3.1–11.4.8 (499–503). The Iberian kingdom has been largely neglected in modern scholarship. Until recently there was no article in Pauly-Wissowa, and the present contribution by H. Treidler (*RE* suppl. IX 1899–1911) is disappointingly lacunose in its historical coverage. See, however, the passing comments of Magie, *RRAM* I 358–359, and the somewhat diffuse survey by F. Grosso, "Aspetti della politica orientale di Domiziano," *Epigraphica* 16 (1954) 117–179.

²⁸ Dio 37.3.1; Plut. *Pomp.* 34.8 (cf. 34.1: Ἰβηρες ἐπὶ τὰ Μοσχικὰ ὄρη καὶ τὸν Πόντον καθέκοντες); Strabo 11.1.6 (492).

²⁹ Arr. *Peripl.* 11.2.

to the northern Caspian plains.³⁰ The two kingdoms were geographically inseparable, culturally related, and frequently (but, as we shall see, not always) allied by motives of common interest.

The first Roman contacts were traumatic. In 65 B.C. Pompey defeated the kings of Iberia and Albania and paraded hostages from the two kingdoms in his triumph.³¹ Again in 36 B.C. one of Antony's lieutenants, P. Canidius Crassus, invaded and subjugated the kingdoms, forcing them into alliance with Rome.³² These, however, were peripheral actions, a sidepiece to Pompey's pursuit of Tigranes and a prelude to Antony's invasion of Parthia. The Caucasian kingdoms were remote from the mainstream of Roman politics and remained so. They are mentioned only in passing in the list of embassies seeking *amicitia* with Rome in Augustus' reign, and during the Julio-Claudian period they are mentioned as Roman allies in the episodic struggle for Armenia.³³ But as yet there was no Roman military presence in the area. It was the latter years of Nero which witnessed the first attempts at military penetration. By the time of the Jewish Revolt the eastern Black Sea from Pontus to the Bosphorus had been placed under direct Roman control with a permanent garrison and fleet stationed in Trapezus.³⁴ Nero's ambitions apparently went further, and by 68 he had sent detachments from Germany, Britain, and Illyricum to the east for the war which he was planning for the Caspian Gates and the Albanians.³⁵ Nero's motives are not stated, and scholars have leaped to the hypothesis that it was the security of Asia Minor which dominated his calculations; the Caucasian passes were to be held against invasion from the north. Mommsen set a fashion when he emended the Albanians out of the text of Tacitus, substituting the Alani.³⁶ But it has yet to be shown that the Sarmatian

³⁰ Strabo 11.4.1 (501), 4.5 (502); Pliny *NH* 6.29, 39; Ptol. 5.10.1. For Albanian control of the Pass of Derbend see Tac. *Ann.* 6.33.3; Strabo 11.4.1.

³¹ Dio 37.1.3; Plut. *Pomp.* 34; App. *Mithr.* 103.480-482; Strabo 11.1.6 (491), 3.5 (501); cf. Magie, *RRAM* I 358-359; Grosso (above, n.27) 125-127.

³² Plut. *Ant.* 34.10; Dio 49.24.1; Strabo 11.3.5 (501).

³³ *Res Gestae* 31.2; Strabo 6.4.2 (288); Tac. *Ann.* 6.33-36; 11.8.1; 12.44-51 (cf. Magie I 551-553); 13.37.3; 14.23.3.

³⁴ Jos. *BJ* 2.366-367. For the relevance of the passage to the latter years of Nero see A. von Domaszewski, *Rh. Mus.* 47 (1892) 207-218.

³⁵ Tac. *Hist.* 1.6.4; multi ad hoc numeri e Germania ac Britannia et Illyrico quos idem Nero electos praemissosque ad claustra Caspiarum et bellum, quod in Albanos parabat, opprimendis Vindicis coeptis revocaverat. Cf. Pliny 6.40; Dio 63.8.1; Suet. *Nero* 19.2.

³⁶ Mommsen, *Provinces of the Roman Empire* (London 1909) II 62 n.1. The suggestion has been received with some favor: e.g., Täubler (above, n.10) 14; Anderson, *CAH.* X 777, 883; Magie, *RRAM* II 1418 n.63, all of whom see

peoples of the north had presented any threat to Roman security. Where they had impinged upon Roman politics it had been in Rome's interests. Furthermore no source suggests that Nero's motives were defensive, and they are unlikely to have been so. In A.D. 66 Armenia had been formally ceded to the brother of the Parthian king and was *de facto* if not *de iure* in Parthian hands. The events of 35 had shown that the Caucasian kingdoms were an invaluable launching pad for operations into Armenia and Media, and their occupation was a necessary preliminary to any future war. The Caucasus was also a logical direction for Roman expansion. In 64 Pontus had been annexed beyond Trapezus and absorbed into the province of Galatia. Roman provincial territory extended to the borders of Iberia and Roman troops could now travel along Pompey's route in reverse, beginning at the Phasis, securing the Darial Pass, and finally moving down the valley of the Cyrus towards Albania and the Caspian Sea. Annexation for annexation's sake is hardly unlikely, given the grandiose ambitions of Nero's last years.

Nero's plans were frustrated by the outbreak of revolt in the west, but they seem to have been adopted and largely fulfilled by the Flavian emperors. The evidence is almost wholly epigraphical, but what there is is eloquent. In A.D. 75 Roman soldiers improved the fortifications of Harmozica, the principal fortress of the Iberians, situated immediately south of the Darial Pass.³⁷ During the reign of Domitian a fortress north of modern Baku was in the hands of a detachment from XII Fulminata, the garrison legion of Melitene in Cappadocia.³⁸ The strategic importance of this fortress is comparable to that of Harmozica. It commanded the coastal Pass of Derbend, the second great strategic

Nero's action as a defensive move against the Sarmatian peoples. W. Schur, *Die Orientpolitik des Kaisers Nero* (1932) 62 ff, accepted Tacitus' reading but thought that Nero's objective was to secure the trade routes with Bactria and India. More recently F. Carrata Thomes (above, n.3) 12 suggested that Nero was creating a vast defensive arc from the Black Sea to the Caspian, again as a measure against the Sarmatians.

³⁷ *SEG XX* 112; cf. A. J. Boltounova, "Quelques notes sur l'inscription de Vespasien, trouvée à Mtskhetha," *Klio* 53 (1971) 213-222. For the strategic importance of Harmozica see Strabo 11.3.5 (501), who implies that it was the principal border fortress of Iberia. Pliny *NH* 6.29-30 confirms that the town, which he calls Harmastus, was salient for the Darial Pass. See also Ptol. 5.10.2; 8.19.6; *Geogr. Rav.* 2.8. On the inscription Mithridates is termed *φιλοκαίσαρι* *καὶ φιλορωμαίων*, the traditional appellations of client kings.

³⁸ *AE* 1951.263: Imp. Domitiano Caesare Aug. Germanic(o) L. Iulius Maximus 7 Leg. XII Ful(minatae). The inscription was discovered on the small hill of Bejuk Dağ, a natural fortress some 70 kilometers north of Baku; cf. F. Grosso, *Epigraphica* 16 (1954) 117 ff.

key to the Caucasus. There is additional evidence for the Domitianic period in an occasional poem by Statius, composed in 95 (*Silv.* 4.4.63–64). This is addressed to Vitorius Marcellus, and in the relevant passage Statius reviews the areas in which the young senator might serve after his praetorship. After the Rhine, Britain, and the Danube he speaks of *metuenda portae limina Caspiae*. Statius is thinking in terms of a legionary legateship, and he presents the Caspian Gates as the natural sphere of operations of the Cappadocian army. The Roman presence in the Caucasus seems assured, and it may have been a purely defensive measure, to block any future incursions by the Alani.³⁹ It is equally true, however, that Roman troops would have been established in the passes whatever the circumstances once the Romans gained military control of the area. It was now the Romans, not the kings of Iberia and Albania, who would determine the movements of the Sarmatians to the north, and, if necessary, call them in to ravage Parthian territory. It is hardly surprising that Vologaeses threatened war against Rome at roughly the same time as the fortification of Harmozica.⁴⁰ At all events, by the end of the Flavian period both Iberia and Albania were firmly embedded in the frontier system of Rome. Their dependency is strikingly illustrated in the great congress at Elegeia held by Trajan in 114. This meeting is sparsely documented by Eutropius, Festus, and Jerome, but the statements are at least coherent and derived from a common source. Trajan apparently installed a new king over Albania and received formal submission both from the Iberians and from the Sarmatian peoples beyond the Caucasus.⁴¹ The whole area was carefully settled as far as the Bosphorus, and Arrian in the *Periplus* supplies

³⁹ At the same time Tiridates of Armenia was repairing the citadel of Gorneae, close to the capital of Artaxata (*SEG* XV 836 [76/77 A.D.]; *BE* 1956.345), but he had been at the center of the Alani invasion and could be excused for building up his defenses. The Romans had no such pressing motive. The fact that Statius refers to the Caspian Gates as *metuenda* has been taken as evidence that the Romans as late as 95 feared incursions by the Alani (Magie II 1438 n.24). This is too much weight for a single word to bear; the possibility of Sarmatian invasions was not the only reason why the central Caucasus might have been dreaded.

⁴⁰ Pliny *Pan.* 14; Victor *De Caes.* 9.10; Epit. *De Caes.* 9.12; cf. G. W. Bowersock, "Syria under Vespasian," *JRS* 63 (1973) 133–140, esp. 135.

⁴¹ Eutropius 8.2.2; Rufius Festus *Brev.* 20.2: Albanis regem dedit, Hiberos, Bosphorianos, Colchos in fidem Romanae dicionis recepit; Jerome *Chron.* p. 194 (Helm): Hiberos, Sauromatas, Osroenes, Arabas, Bosforanos, Colchos in fidem recepit. These transactions are commemorated in gold and silver issues of Trajan's reign, which bear the legend REGNA ADSIGNATA; cf. P. L. Strack, *Untersuchungen zur röm. Reichsprägung des zweiten Jahrhunderts* I 222 f; R. Göbl, *Rh. Mus.* 104 (1961) 73–75.

information about the numerous petty kings who owed their thrones to Trajan.⁴² Roman control in the Caucasus was now complete, and it is no surprise to find an Iberian prince of the royal house serving with Trajan's armies at Nisibis.⁴³

The accession of Hadrian brought a fundamental change. From the Roman side Trajan's eastern conquests were renounced and the Roman frontier thrown back to the Euphrates. On the Iberian throne there was also a change. Pharasmanes II seems to have been an able and strong-minded monarch, and his ambition was clearly complete independence from Rome. In this he was apparently successful. In 131, when Hadrian visited Cappadocia, Pharasmanes rejected an invitation to meet the emperor at another congress, probably held at Satala.⁴⁴ Such a meeting would have emphasized his dependent status, and Pharasmanes had no intention of repeating the submission offered to Trajan at Elegeia. Relations between Rome and Iberia became strained, as Arrian demonstrates in the *Periplus*. He takes pains to show exactly where the domains of Pharasmanes ended,⁴⁵ and, most significantly, he reveals that at the mouth of the river Apsarus there was a force of five auxiliary cohorts, by far the largest concentration on the Cappadocian coast.⁴⁶ Now the Apsarus is at a salient position of the coast, very close to the Zydreitae of the Iberian border, and it was on his way to the Apsarus in late 66 B.C. that Mithridates was obstructed by a joint force of Armenians and Iberians.⁴⁷ It looks as though Arrian's five cohorts were an outer defense against Iberia. They guarded the road inland to the Caucasus, and the size of the force reflects the unsettled conditions.

In 135 Pharasmanes invoked the Alani, but not against Rome. The first victims were his neighbors, the Albani. This is perhaps not sur-

⁴² Arr. *Peripl.* 11.2-3; cf. Dio 68.19.2.

⁴³ IG XIV 1374 = IGR I 192: an epitaph for Amazaspus, brother of king Mithridates, who died at Nisibis (Groag, *RE* XIII 1879-1880; M. N. Tod, *JRS* 33 [1943] 86).

⁴⁴ HA *Hadr.* 13.9: cumque ad eum quidam reges venissent, ita cum his egit ut eos paeniteret qui venire noluerunt, causa speciatim Pharasmanis, qui eius invitationem superbe neglexerit. The most likely place for this meeting is Satala, which Hadrian had made the center of his visit to Cappadocia; cf. Arr. *Periplus* 1.1; 16.6; 11.2-3; 18.3. Magie I 621 dates these transactions to the period after Hadrian's return from Egypt — some time in 131.

⁴⁵ *Periplus* 11.2.

⁴⁶ *Periplus* 6.2. There is confirmation in an inscription of Hadrian's reign which refers to *numeros(um) tendentium in Ponto Absaro* (ILS 2660). The next largest garrison mentioned is the 400 strong force at the Phasis mouth (*Periplus* 9.3).

⁴⁷ Appian *Mithr.* 101.464 f; cf. Magie II 1224-1225 n.10.

prising, for there had been intermittent hostility between the two kingdoms (explicitly attested under Claudius).⁴⁸ It is quite possible that in 135 the Albani turned towards their southern neighbors, the Medes, just as Pharasmanes I in 51 had appealed to Rome. Whatever the reasons for his action, Pharasmanes unleashed the Alani, dispatched them through the Caspian Gates, and watched complacently while they wrought havoc in Albania and Media Atropatene. As in 72 the Medes were helpless; Vologaeses II could only appeal to Rome,⁴⁹ with as little success as his namesake in the previous century. So far the raid was a repeat of the previous invasion, and the Alani returned through Armenia as before with their booty. But this time they made the error of encroaching upon Roman Cappadocia and encountered the provincial army under Arrian. The resulting demonstration of force drove them northwards into the Caucasus and away from Roman territory.

Dio's account deserts us at this point, but we can take the story further thanks to Themistius, the learned philosopher and orator of fourth century Constantinople. In 384 Themistius was made city prefect by Theodosius, and was immediately lampooned as having compromised his philosophical standards by accepting public office.⁵⁰ He replied in a monograph (*Orat.* 34), justifying his office and citing a number of precedents from earlier history. The crux of the argument is that the Antonine emperors, Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, drafted for political service the two most prominent philosophers of their age, Flavius Arrianus and Q. Iunius Rusticus. Themistius unfortunately conflates the two men, saying that both repelled the Alani and both became *ordinarii*,⁵¹ whereas we know that it was Arrian who distinguished himself against the Alani and Rusticus who held the eponymous consulate.⁵² But once we have separated the two, Themistius' evidence about Arrian becomes impressive. He not only crossed the Caspian Gates but regulated boundaries between the Iberian and Albanian kingdoms. This is not rhetorical bombast, but precise and detailed information, and the statement about boundary regulation is surely too

⁴⁸ Tac. *Ann.* 12.45.2: proelianti sibi (sc. Pharasmani) adversus regem Albanorum et Romanos auxilio vocanti.

⁴⁹ Dio 69.15.2.

⁵⁰ Cf. W. Stegemann, *RE* V A 1646, 1666; *Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire* I (Cambridge 1971) 889-894.

⁵¹ Themistius 34.8 (T 13 Roos): καὶ διέβαινον μὲν στρατηγοὶ Ῥωμαίων Πύλας Κασπίας, ἐξήλανον δὲ Ἀλανοὺς ἐξ Ἀρμενίας, ἔταττον δὲ Ἰβηραν ὁρους καὶ Ἀλβανοῖς. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἅπασι τὴν ἐπώνυμον τῶν ὑπᾶτων ἀρχὴν ἐκαρποῦντο.

⁵² Rusticus was *consul ordinarius* in 162 (cos. II), whereas Arrian's consulship in 129 or 130 was suffect (cf. A. B. Bosworth, *CQ* 22 [1972] 165).

precise, and obscure, to have been invented. In the rest of the context Themistius gives parallels from the careers of celebrated philosophers of the Republic, and where his material can be checked it seems accurate.⁵³ We should at least treat his evidence with some respect and investigate the possibility that Arrian did in fact penetrate Iberia and settle the affairs of the kingdom.

One thing seems certain. By the end of Hadrian's reign Pharasmanes was still king of Iberia, but he had become more amenable. According to the *Historia Augusta* there was an exchange of gifts. Pharasmanes offered gold cloaks, a gift which Hadrian treated with contempt, and in return he received a *quingenaria cohors* from Rome.⁵⁴ A present of an auxiliary cohort looks suspiciously like a garrison in thin disguise. Early in the reign of Pius, Pharasmanes made a personal appearance in Rome, where he was prominently fêted and apparently had his kingdom expanded.⁵⁵ Superficially this was a mark of high honor, but Pharasmanes had made direct and public submission to Rome; and the extension of his kingdom was not due to his own efforts, but a grant by the emperor, no doubt based on recommendations made by Arrian during his legateship. There is a further, tantalizing piece of evidence. In 1940 a bilingual inscription in Greek and Aramaic was discovered at Mçeta (Harmozica), at the heart of the ancient kingdom of Iberia.⁵⁶ This commemorates the

⁵³ Themistius refers to the relations between Alexander and Aristotle, Augustus and Arius (cf. Julian *Ep. ad Them.* 11.265 C-D), Scipio and Panaetius, and finally Tiberius and Thrasyllus. He also names a number of republican writers and philosophers who held magistracies: Cato (quaestor 64), Brutus (praetor 44), Varro (praetor after 76 B.C.; Broughton, *MRR.* II 466), P. Rutilius Rufus (cos. 105). The only case where there is no corroborative evidence is the statement that Favonius held the tribunate.

⁵⁴ HA *Hadr.* 17.11-12. The manuscripts read *quinguenariam cohortem*, surely, as Casaubon thought, an error for *quingenariam*. The auxiliary *cohors quingenaria* is a commonplace in the second century A.D. (Ruggiero, *Dizionario Epigrafico* II [1] 329), whereas a cohort fifty strong would be unique and incongruous. See also HA *Hadr.* 21.13; the exchange of gifts took place after the first conference, which the kings of Iberia and Albania had scorned.

⁵⁵ Dio 69.15.3. A recently discovered fragment of the Fasi Ostiensis attests the presence of Pharasmanes and his family at Rome but gives no hint of the year of his visit (H. Nesselhauf, *Athenaeum* 36 [1958] 219-228; *AE* 1959.38).

⁵⁶ SEG XVI 781 (Greek only); cf. M. N. Tod, *JRS* 33 (1943) 82-86; J. and L. Robert, *BE* 1944.192; 1948.251a; B. M. Metzger, *JNES* 15 (1956) 18-26 (Greek and Aramaic); P. Grelot, *Semitica* 8 (1958) 11-20 (translation of Aramaic p. 19); F. Carrata Thomes (above, n.3) 23 ff; F. Altheim, *Geschichte der Hunnen* (Berlin 1959) I 247-252; H. Donner and W. Röllig, *Kanaanäische und aramäische Inschriften*, 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden 1966-1969), no. 276: bibliography and commentary, II 328-330.

untimely death of a noble lady, Serapitis, who obviously belonged to the highest court circles. I quote the Aramaic version, which is slightly different from the Greek: "I am Serapit, daughter of Zewah the younger, *pitiāx* of Parsman the king, wife of Yodmangan — both victorious and having wrought many victories as chief of the court of Hsepharnug the king — son of Agrippa, chief of the court of Parsman the king."⁵⁷ Two kings are involved, Pharasmanes/Parsman and Xepharnug. Xepharnug is otherwise unknown, but his predecessor, Pharasmenes, can only be Pharasmanes II, the contemporary of Hadrian and Arrian.⁵⁸ Two generations are involved, and it seems that the fathers of Serapitis and her husband, Yodmangan, both held the office of *pitiāx*, a senior court official, perhaps corresponding to the Achaemenid "King's Eye." Serapitis' husband is named Yodmangan clearly a native Iberian, but his father, most surprisingly, has the sound Latin name Publicius Agrippa (given fully in the Greek text).⁵⁹ Publicius Agrippa was *pitiāx* of Pharasmanes II and sufficiently integrated into Iberian society to produce a son who was wholly Iberian. How did Agrippa attain the rank he did? It is possible that he was an immigrant, but, if so, the Iberian kingdom had an absence of racial prejudice which is as admirable as it is astounding. More probably he was installed at court as an act of policy by Arrian himself during his regulation of the borders of Iberia and Albania. Pharasmanes' behavior had been suspicious in the extreme; now there was an automatic check imposed by the installation of a Roman officer in a key position at court. Arrian may even have had in mind the practice of Alexander the Great — of installing a Macedonian

⁵⁷ Σηραπειτίς Ζηουάχου τοῦ νεωτέρου πιτιάξου θυγάτηρ, Πουβλικίου Ἀγρίππα πιτιάξου υἱοῦ Ἰωδμανγάνου γυνή, τοῦ πολλὰς νείκας ποιήσαντος ἐπιτρόπου βασιλέως Ἰβήρων μεγάλου Ξεφαρνούγου. For the functions of the *pitiāx* see Metzger (above, n.56) 21 ff; Donner and Röllig II 329.

⁵⁸ The Aramaic text states that Xepharnug was the successor of Pharasmanes. The first century Pharasmanes survived into the reign of Nero (Tac. *Ann.* 13.37.3; 14.26.2) and was succeeded by his son, Mithridates (Tod [above, n.56] 85). A Mithridates was king of Iberia around the time of Trajan (*IGR* I 192), and there seems no time in the interim for a second Pharasmanes and Xepharnug to have ruled. There is no alternative. The Pharasmanes of the epitaph must be identified with Pharasmanes II, the contemporary of Hadrian and Arrian.

⁵⁹ Publicius Agrippa is an extremely rare name, not to be found in the indices of *CIL*. He cannot have been an Iberian noble who received Roman citizenship, for grants to distinguished members of client kingdoms would have been conferred by the emperor, and we should expect the recipient to bear an imperial *nomen*. The one Roman name which is attested in the Iberian royal house is *Flavius Dades* (cf. Boltounova [above, n.37] 221).

supervisor alongside a native satrap as an insurance against insurrection.⁶⁰

The evidence indicates that by the end of Hadrian's reign the Iberian kingdom had become a placid vassal of Rome, and it coheres exactly with Themistius' statement that Arrian intervened in Iberia after his pursuit of the Alani to the Caspian Gates.⁶¹ It would seem that Arrian's principal achievement in 135 was not so much the victory over the Alani but the settlement of the Caucasian kingdoms. The Alani invasion was the immediate cause and pretext for intervention, but from the Roman point of view its importance was secondary. It is, however, the encounter with the Alani which attracts most attention because of the unique picture Arrian gives of a Roman army in action during the second century A.D., and it is to the *Ἑκταξίς κατὰ Ἀλανῶν* that we must next turn.

The *Ectaxis* has come down to us as a sadly mutilated torso. Thanks to the loss of a folium in the archetype it breaks off in mid sentence, and, as we shall see, the remaining text is distorted by lacunae. In form it is a series of orders for an impending battle. These orders fall into three parts, the first dealing with the march in column to the battle site, the second with the arrangement of the Roman forces before battle, and the third with the tactics to be used in the battle itself. In the course of his dispositions Arrian reviews the various units of his army, both legionary and auxiliary, and in the main they can be correlated with units attested either epigraphically or in the fourth century *Notitia Dignitatum*. The work of identification was done long ago by Grotefend, Mommsen, and Ritterling, and more recent discoveries have added little to their results.⁶² Only one serious mystery persists — the identification of the unit three times named in the text as *Ἀπλανοί*. They appear in the order of march with the provincial levy of Cappadocia (7), but they are clearly heavier troops, associated in the advance flank guard of the battle line

⁶⁰ For examples of these *ἐπίσκοποι* see Arr. *Anab.* 3.22.1; 3.25.2; 3.28.4. Cf. H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* (1926) I 126–129.

⁶¹ Lydus *De mag.* 3.53 (T 14 Roos) implies that Arrian was at the Caspian Gates, but the context is vague and inaccurate.

⁶² The preliminary work was done by C. L. Grotefend, *Philologus* 26 (1867) 18–28. Further modifications were added by Mommsen, *Gesammelte Schriften* VI 148, but the fundamental article is that by E. Ritterling, "Zur Erklärung von Arrians *Ἑκταξίς κατὰ Ἀλανῶν*," *Wiener Studien* 24 (1902) 359–372. Ritterling's identifications are definitive and have been largely confirmed. His suspicion that the *Ἰνδοί* of *Ectaxis* 3; 9 and 13 were a *cohors voluntariorum civium Romanorum* (cf. *CIL* VI 3654) was strikingly confirmed by an inscription from the reign of Marcus Aurelius attesting that a *cohors miliaria equitata C.R.* served in the depths of Armenia with *vexillationes* from the two Cappadocian legions (*ILS* 9117). See also *AE* 1968.528 for the *ala II Ulpia Auriana* (*Ect.* 1).

with men of the *cohors III Cyrenaica*. They look like an auxiliary cohort, but no known cohort could be associated with the name Ἀπλανοί, and scholars resorted to various emendations, all inconclusive.⁶³ The problem can perhaps now be resolved, thanks to the recent discovery that a *cohors Apula* existed in Asia Minor as early as the time of Augustus.⁶⁴ This may be the predecessor of the unit of the Cappadocian army listed in the *Notitia Dignitatum* as *cohors Apuleta* (Or. 38.34), and it seems to me the most likely identification of the Ἀπλανοί of Arrian (read Ἀπυλανοί?). But these are marginalia. We must move to the battle itself and examine the problems of strategy it posed.

Because the *Ectaxis* is written as a set of orders there is naturally very little illustrative detail. In particular there is scant information precisely where Arrian envisaged the engagement taking place. He merely states that the field of battle was a fairly narrow plain, flanked on both sides by steeply rising high ground.⁶⁵ This is very general and unhelpful, but there are passing clues to the identification of the battle site. In the first place only one of the Cappadocian legions, XV Apollinaris, was present at full strength. The men of XII Fulminata are stated to have been far less numerous, and they seem to have comprised *vexillationes* led by tribunes (6). The legate was elsewhere, perhaps commanding detachments of his men in Judaea, where the war had only just ended,⁶⁶ but

⁶³ The most favored candidate was Grotefend's Λεπιδιανοί (above, n.62) 26 (cf. Ritterling [above, n.62] 368); this assumes the unit to have been the *cohors I Lepidiana* of the *Notitia Dignitatum* (Or. 38.35). Seeck's Ἀπλημιοί (*cohors Apuleia* C.R.) was approved by Mommsen, *Ges. Schr.* VI 148 n.2.

⁶⁴ J. M. Cook, *The Troad* 412 nr. 50: praef. cohort(is) Apulae et operum quae in colonia (sc. Alexandria Troas) iussu Augusti facta sunt. Cf. also G. E. Bean, *Inscriptions of Side* nr. 155 (with fig. 61); P. A. Brunt, *ZPE* 13 (1974) 180–182. There is another possible candidate. Professor Pflaum has kindly brought to my notice a recently discovered inscription which attests the presence in Cappadocia of a *cohors I Apamenorum sagittariorum* (A. Degrassi, *Scritti vari di Antichità* [Venice-Trieste 1967] 110 ff). It seems unlikely, however, that this cohort is identical with Arrian's Ἀπλανοί. In the first place *cohors I Apamenorum* was transferred to Egypt, where it is first attested in A.D. 145 (Degrassi 114). It is hard to see any reason for the move in the decade after Arrian's encounter with the Alani; one thinks rather of the Jewish insurrection of 115–117. More importantly, Arrian's text suggests that the Ἀπλανοί were something other than a cohort of archers. They are described as ὀπλίται (14); and they do not appear in the list of specialized *cohortes sagittariorum* (18; see below, n.80). Nor is the corruption (Ἀπαμνηοί to Ἀπλανοί) particularly easy to explain.

⁶⁵ *Ect.* 11–12, 14, 25, 30.

⁶⁶ A *vexillatio* from XII Fulminata is named on a dedication to Hadrian found in Jerusalem (R. Savignac, *Revue biblique* 1904.94 ff). *AE* 1962.274, found near Caesarea, may also date from Hadrian's reign (B. Lifschitz, *Latomus* 31 [1962] 149).

equally he may have remained at his headquarters at Melitene, while the action took place to the north in Lesser Armenia. XV Apollinaris was quartered at Satala, just above the headwaters of the Euphrates in Lesser Armenia. That is the area from which Arrian's native levies were derived — from Lesser Armenia itself, from Trapezus immediately to the north, and from Colchis and Rhizus on the adjacent east coast of the Black Sea.⁶⁷ The action was clearly coordinated from Satala,⁶⁸ and it was confined to the extreme northwest of Cappadocia. Dio, it will be remembered, confirms that the Alani only touched upon the Roman province. We cannot be more precise, unfortunately, about the site of the battlefield. Arrian's narrative suggests the vicinity of a pass, and the action must have been on a main road, for the Alani were returning laden with booty after a successful expedition in Media and Armenia, and, unless their booty comprised mountain goats, they will not have taken to the wilderness. It seems to me that the mountain pass east of modern Erzurum on the ancient military road to Armenia would be an acceptable location; but there are other possibilities and no certainty is possible.

The threat was to the northeast sector of Arrian's province, but what kind of threat was presented? Arrian's defensive measures are anticipated primarily to repel a frontal attack by heavy mailed cavalry. Armored they certainly were, for Arrian envisages his men's pike blades turned aside by the enemy cuirasses (17), and their main offensive weapon was the long Sarmatian lance, which Arrian calls the *κοντός*.⁶⁹ This coheres with the descriptions given in Arrian's *Essay in Tactics*, written in 136/137. The typical mode of attack by the Sarmatians and Alani, he says, is a direct charge with lances to thrust aside the enemy defense, and it contrasts with the circling skirmishing tactics of the Armenians and Parthians.⁷⁰ Tacitus gives similar descriptions of Sarmatian cavalry in action both in Armenia and across the Danube, and he confirms that they were heavily mailed, used tactics of frontal assault, and relied on broadswords and long lances as offensive weapons.⁷¹ There is however,

⁶⁷ Cf. *Ect.* 7, 14. The significance of the *symmachiarii* for the location of the battle was noticed by H. F. Pelham, *Essays on Roman History* 227.

⁶⁸ On the strategic position of Satala see now T. B. Mitford, *JRS* 64 (1974) 165–166.

⁶⁹ *Ect.* 17 καὶ θυρεῶ <ῆ> καταφράκτω θώρακι ἐμπαγέντος τοῦ κοντοῦ. *Ect.* 31 πλαγίους μὲν αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἵππους, πλαγίους δὲ τοὺς κοντούς. The latter passage must refer to the enemy, not to Arrian's own cavalry, of whom only a minority were armed with κοντοί (*Ect.* 22; cf. *Tact.* 4.7–9).

⁷⁰ *Tact.* 4.3; cf. 4.7; 11.2; 44.1.

⁷¹ Tac. *Hist.* 1.79.2–3; nihil ad pedestrem pugnam tam ignavum; ubi per turmas advenere vix ulla acies obsteterit. sed tum umido die et soluto gelu neque

a discordant note in the picture. At the end of the *Ectaxis* Arrian faces the possibility of enemy cavalry riding round his flanks. In that case, he says, the enemy and their *κοντοί* will be at right angles to his own rear defense of cavalry. They must therefore attack at close quarters with swords and battle axes (31). The manuscript breaks off with the words: οἱ δὲ Σκύθαι γυμνοὶ τε ὄντες καὶ τοὺς ἵππους γυμνοὺς ἔχοντες . . . As it stands, this is astounding. The whole weight of the evidence and the tenor of Arrian's orders is that the enemy striking force consisted of heavy cavalry, yet here he says explicitly that they were unarmored.⁷² Something must be wrong, and in all probability the text breaks off at a misleading point.

Some light is shed on the problem by the descriptions in Plutarch of the encounters between Parthian cataphracts and the troops of Lucullus and Crassus. These cataphracts were heavily armed and used long lances (*κοντοί*), yet they were vulnerable in two areas; the riders' thighs and horses' bellies were unprotected (Plutarch uses the word *γυμνά*).⁷³ It was at these vulnerable points that the Romans aimed — with telling effect. Now the Parthian mailed cavalry was borrowed from the Saca peoples of ancient Chorasmia,⁷⁴ the homeland both of the Alani and the Arsacid dynasty of Parthia, and it can be assumed that the two peoples used similar armament. That is probably the clue to the interpretation of Arrian. The Alani and their horses, he probably said, were unprotected

conti neque gladii, quos praelongos utraque manu regunt, usui. Compare Tac. *Ann.* 6.35.1–2, describing the Alani in A.D. 35

⁷² Pelham (above, n.67) 231, accepts the text at full value and talks of "the dreaded light horseman of the east."

⁷³ Plut. *Lucullus* 28.4: *κελεύσας μηδὲν εἶτι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὕσσοις ἀλλ' ἐκ χειρὸς ἕκαστον διαλαβόντα παίειν τῶν πολεμίων κνήμας τε καὶ μηρούς, ἃ μόνῃ γυμνά . . . ἔστιν.* Plut. *Crassus* 25.8: *πολλοὶ δὲ τοὺς ἐναντῶν ἀπολείποντες ἵππους καὶ ὑποδύμενοι τοῖς ἐκείνων ἔντυπον εἰς τοὺς γαστέρας.* Lucullus' tactics at Tigranocerta strongly resemble Arrian's in other ways; note particularly his order to the cavalry to charge at the enemy flank, *ἐκ πλαγίου προσφερόμενους παρακρούεσθαι ταῖς μαχαίραις τοὺς κοντοὺς* (Plut. *Lucullus* 28.2–3; cf. Arr. *Ect.* 31). The battle of Tigranocerta occurred two centuries before Arrian, but the mailed cavalymen seem to have evolved remarkably little. The *clibanarii* of Sasanid times were vulnerable in precisely the same way (cf. R. M. Rattenbury, "An Ancient Armoured Force," *CR* 56 [1942] 113–116).

⁷⁴ On the mailed cavalry of Chorasmia see B. Rubin, "Die Entstehung der Kataphraktenreiterei im Lichte der chorasmischen Ausgrabungen," *Historia* 4 (1955) 264–283; J. W. Eadie, "The Development of Roman Mailed Cavalry," *JRS* 57 (1967) 161 ff (esp. 162–163). The Saca peoples (Massagetae and Dahae) had fully evolved a heavy cavalry, with both horse and rider armored, by the time of Alexander the Great (Arr. *Anab.* 3.13.5; Curt. 4.9.3).

in the thighs and belly and *nowhere else*. These were the areas for his own cavalry to aim for. The text may have continued on these lines: τοὺς ἵππους γυμνοὺς ἔχοντες οὐδαμοῦ, εἰ μὴ κατὰ τοὺς μηρούς καὶ γαστέρας . . . >

The challenge to Arrian's generalship was the offensive power of the mailed cavalry. How did he respond to it? The earlier part of the *Ectaxis* is somewhat unhelpful in this respect. As far as can be seen, Arrian's advance to battle is comparable to the great columns of march led by Vespasian into Galilee and by Titus through Samaria. These are described in detail by Josephus and represented as orthodox procedure: καθὰ Ῥωμαίοις σύνθητες.⁷⁵ The similarities with the *Ectaxis* are the segregation of cavalry in the vanguard, the placing of the siege engines in front of the legionary troops and the baggage train at the rear of the column, and the ceremonial progress of legionary legates and tribunes with the eagles, each surrounded with his own guard. This latter feature seems to have been standard in Roman armies on the march; Tacitus' description of Vitellius' march on Rome is almost a translation of Arrian: "ante aquilas praefecti castrorum tribunique et primi centurionum candida veste."⁷⁶ There are, however, peculiar features in Arrian's column of march. He seems particularly concerned with the protection of the flank, making sure that there is a cavalry screen for all the infantry groups. The cavalry of the auxiliary cohorts are explicitly detailed for flank guards, and the entire legionary column seems to have been flanked by a single file of auxiliary cavalry.⁷⁷ A similar safeguard is Arrian's placing a contingent of marksmen at the head of each section of the column; the cavalry are preceded by horse archers; archers again are placed at the head of the auxiliary foot, and in advance of the legionary standards there is a body of ἀκοντισταί.⁷⁸ It looks as though Arrian was anticipating attack even before he reached his chosen battle ground, and he took advance precautions. The cavalry flank guard would frustrate a massed attack on the side of the column and hold up the charge while the infantry aligned itself for defense; at the same time the archers of the army were in a position where they could almost instantly give the

⁷⁵ Jos. *BJ* 5.47-50; 3.115-120.

⁷⁶ Tac. *Hist.* 2.89.2; compare Arrian *Ect.* 5. Cf. A. von Domaszewski, *Rh. Mus.* 57 (1902) 512.

⁷⁷ *Ect.* 4 τὰς δὲ πλευρὰς τῆς τάξεως φυλαττόντων ἐκατέρωθεν οἱ ἵππεις οἱ οἰκείοι. *Ect.* 9 φυλακῆς δὲ ἕνεκα <ῆ> εἴλη ἡ Γαλατικὴ περιπνεύτω . . . καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἰταλῶν ἵππεις.

⁷⁸ *Ect.* 1, 4: αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων ὅσοι τοξόται ἡγήσθων. 5: πρὸ δὲ τοῦ σημείου αὐτῶν πεζῶν οἱ ἀκοντισταὶ τετάχθων.

concerted firepower which Arrian believes is his principal trump card in the coming battle.⁷⁹ We should incidentally note the preponderance of archers in the auxiliary forces. Of nine *cohortes equitatae* present in Arrian's column no less than five seem to have comprised archers,⁸⁰ and he seems deliberately to have concentrated the greatest possible fire power in his army.

We must move now to the actual dispositions for battle. Arrian's position is entirely defensive, the legionary infantry forming a solid barrier across the plain and extending into the hills on both sides.⁸¹ The wings are formed from the native Armenian and Cappadocian troops, predominantly light infantry, and on each extremity there is a small advance guard of heavy infantry from the auxiliary cohorts.⁸² This accounts for the entire front line. The second line of defense consists of archers, all infantry from the auxiliary cohorts, deployed in an extended line behind the legionary infantry.⁸³ In the rear are assembled the cavalry, again with the horse archers to the fore.⁸⁴ Except for these archers the cavalry will have no role in the battle itself. They will take the brunt of the pursuit and counter any flanking move by the enemy, but it is not anticipated that the cavalry will participate in the engagement proper.⁸⁵ In fact Arrian is optimistic that there will be no hand-to-hand fighting. If his lethal barrage of missiles is successful, the Alani will retreat before even coming to blows with the Roman infantry.⁸⁶ The infantry are intended to be an impenetrable wall if the enemy pursue their charge after the artillery is exhausted. Finally, if in despair they attempt to encircle the Roman line, they are to be met with a murderous charge by

⁷⁹ *Ect.* 25-26.

⁸⁰ Cohors III Ulpia Petraeorum (*Ect.* 1); cohorts Iytraeorum (*Ect.* 1, 18); cohorts III Cyrenaica; cohorts I Bosporana (*Ect.* 3, 18); cohorts I Numidarum. Men from these cohorts provide virtually all the auxiliary foot. No infantry are attested from the cohorts IV Rhaetorum, cohorts I Rhaetorum, and cohorts I Germanorum. The only heavy infantry (*σπλίται*) from the auxiliary forces seem to be the men of the cohorts Italica C.R. (*Ect.* 13) and the *Ἀπλανοί* (*Ect.* 14).

⁸¹ *Ect.* 12-15.

⁸² *Ect.* 12-13, cf. 30: ἀνατέινεσθαι μὲν <ἐς> τὰ ὑπερδεξιώτερα ἔτι τὰ κέρατα αὐτῆς τῆς ψιλῆς τοξείας.

⁸³ *Ect.* 18-19. The catapults are intermingled at strategic intervals from end to end of the line.

⁸⁴ *Ect.* 20-21.

⁸⁵ *Ect.* 21: ὅσοι δὲ λογχοφόροι ἢ κοντοφόροι ἢ πελεκοφόροι εἰς τὰ πλάγια τε ἐκατέρωθεν ὁρώντων [ῆ] καὶ τὸ ξύνημα προσμενόντων. Cf. *Ect.* 27-28, 31.

⁸⁶ *Ect.* 25-26, cf. 26: καὶ ἐλπὶς μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀδιηγῆτου πλήθους τῶν βελῶν μηδὲ πλείον πελάσειν τῇ πεζικῇ φάλαγγι ἐπelaύνοντας τοὺς Σκύθας.

the Roman heavy cavalry, already drawn up in anticipation of the move.⁸⁷ It seems as formidable and unyielding a defense as could be devised with the forces at Arrian's disposal.

It is the legionary infantry, the men of XV Apollinaris and XII Fulminata, who form the core of the defense. Arrian gives detailed instructions for their role in the battle, and we see Roman legions fighting in a totally unprecedented fashion. The legionaries are drawn up in a solid mass, eight ranks deep, for all the world like an archaic phalanx of the Hellenistic period. Significantly Arrian describes the formation in the technical language he uses in the *Anabasis* to describe the phalanx of Alexander.⁸⁸ What is more, the troops are not uniformly armed. They are divided into two distinct groups, the *κοντοφόροι*, who were equipped with long thrusting pikes, and the *λογχοφόροι*, whose weapon was a lighter missile javelin. The division of the legions seems to have persisted, as did the nomenclature, for during the 160s Lucian of Samosata traveled to the Pontic coast with an escort from the army of Cappadocia — a *λογχοφόρος* and a *κοντοφόρος*.⁸⁹ Both the division of the legions and the battle technique are new phenomena in Roman history,⁹⁰ and it invites speculation precisely when and why the new departure was made. That question, however, must be deferred until we have considered how the legionary infantry was to be used.

Unfortunately there is a contradiction in the text of the *Ectaxis*. To begin with, Arrian gives seemingly precise details. The phalanx is to be eight ranks deep, the first four comprising *κοντοφόροι* and the rear ranks *λογχοφόροι*.⁹¹ The more important role is played by the *κοντοφόροι*, who use their weapons directly against the charge. The front rank levels its weapons against the horses' chests, while the third and fourth ranks aim indiscriminately at horses and riders, as the opportunity presents itself. There is a lacuna in the text where we expect to find a reference to the role of the second rank.⁹² Perhaps they were ordered to aim

⁸⁷ *Ect.* 26–27 (infantry); *Ect.* 30–31 (defense against a flanking move).

⁸⁸ *Ect.* 15–17. See section 3 for discussion of the terminology.

⁸⁹ Lucian *Alexander* 55.

⁹⁰ Contrast Tacitus' description of the Roman defense against Sarmatian heavy cavalry in A.D. 69. There is no suggestion that they used long pikes in defense: Romanus miles facilis lorica et missili pilo aut lanceis adsultans (*Hist.* 1.79.4).

⁹¹ *Ect.* 15–17: τετάχθων δὲ ἐπὶ ὀκτώ . . . καὶ αἱ μὲν πρῶται τέσσαρες τάξεις ἔστωσαν κοντοφόρων . . . αἱ δὲ ἑφεξῆς τάξεις τῶν λογχοφόρων ἔστωσαν.

⁹² The archetype (the tenth-century codex Laurentianus gr. 55.4) reads οἱ δὲ (followed by a gap of about twenty letters to the end of the line) ὑπεροστάται δὲ καὶ οἱ τῆς τρίτης καὶ τετάρτης τάξεως. In the Didot edition Müller ignored the

specifically at the riders, in which case they and the first rank held their pikes at fixed targets, the charging horses and their riders, while the third and fourth ranks hit out at whatever openings were left. The text may be lacunose, but so far it is unambiguous.

A few paragraphs later (26) Arrian repeats his instructions for repelling the direct charge. The first three ranks, he says, are to meet the onslaught in closest formation; the fourth is to hurl its javelins (λόγχοι) over the preceding ranks, while the third strikes out unstintingly with its κοντοί against horses and riders alike.⁹³ As the passage stands, it is glaringly inconsistent. Only three ranks instead of four have κοντοί and there is no reference to the rear ranks of λογχοφόροι. Either Arrian is writing fiction, and incompetent fiction, or the text is corrupt. Corruption is certainly the more plausible alternative and in my opinion a lacuna is the most probable type of error; as it stands, the text of the *Ectaxis* is demonstrably honeycombed with lacunae. If we assume a break after τὴν τετάρτην δέ, we may suppose that Arrian gave precise instructions to the fourth rank about the use of their κοντοί, instructions which involved a reference to the λογχοφόροι. It will have to be a fairly extensive break in the text, including quite specific orders to balance the enigmatic command to the third rank to use their κοντοί on horses and riders

gap in the manuscript and read οἱ δευτεροστάται, lumping together the second, third, and fourth ranks. There are, however, other gaps in the text (20, 23), and each gap appears to denote a lacuna of indeterminate length (cf. n.142, below). It seems more likely that the men of the second rank were given separate instructions, which have been lost in the lacuna (e.g., οἱ δὲ <τῆς δευτέρας τάξεως ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους αὐτοὺς τιθέντων τοὺς κοντούς> υστεροστάται δὲ [καί] οἱ τῆς τρίτης καὶ τετάρτης κτλ). In that case υστεροστάται must be emended to υστεροστάται, a simple correction which was given as the manuscript reading before Roos' edition. The meaning is "the men behind." Admittedly υστεροστάται is not found outside this passage, but it is a legitimate compound and scarcely more obscure than Müller's δευτεροστάται a word attested elsewhere only in Themistius (*Orat.* 13.175 B), and then in a nonmilitary context. The principal difficulty is the first καί. On my interpretation the υστεροστάται are the third and fourth ranks, not an additional category of troops. There are two alternatives; either, as Professor Badian has suggested to me, καί is used epexegetically in the sense "namely," or it is an intrusion, a gloss by a scribe who misunderstood the context. The theory of an epexegetic καί is superficially the more attractive, but it is difficult to find a parallel in Arrian's work. On the other hand the intrusive καί is relatively frequent in the codex Laurentianus (cf. *Ect.* 9, 13-14; *Tact.* 25.5). I would opt tentatively for the second alternative.

⁹³ *Ect.* 26: δέχεσθαι τὴν προσβολὴν τὰς πρώτας τρεῖς τάξεις . . . τὴν τετάρτην δὲ ὑπερακοντίζειν τὰς λόγχας· καὶ τὴν τρίτην παίνει ἢ ἀκοντίζειν τοῖς κοντοῖς ἀφειδῶς ἐς τε ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὺς.

alike.⁹⁴ Possibly the *κοντοί* were only long enough for the first three ranks to thrust at the enemy as a body (in Polybius' day only the first five ranks of the phalanx could thrust their gigantic *sarisae* effectively at the enemy⁹⁵). The fourth rank would have been used in reserve in case of casualties in front. In that case they might need a warning to keep their weapons in couched position so as not to interfere with the flow of javelins from the rear. I assume therefore a supplement on the following lines: *τὴν τετάρτην δὲ ὑπερέχειν τοὺς κοντοὺς, εἰ ποτε ἵπποτας τινας καταβάλλοιεν, μηδὲ ὀρθοὺς ἀνατείνειν, ὡς καὶ τοῖς λογχοφόροις ἐξείη > ὑπερακοντίζειν τὰς λόγχας*. In other words, the fourth rank was to keep its *κοντοί* couched above the phalanx in order to use them intermittently on any enemy rider who came within range, but not held so high as to deflect the javelins from the rear. The third rank by contrast was in action continuously and used its weapons unstintingly (*ἀφειδῶς*).

It is clear that the first four ranks, the *κοντοφόροι*, were the *robur exercitus*. What kind of weapon did they use? It is interesting that Arrian uses Hellenistic technical terms to describe the maneuvers of his infantry phalanx but does not call their weapons *σάρισαι* or *δόρατα*, the words he uses in the *Anabasis* for the Macedonian pikes.⁹⁶ Instead he uses the word *κοντός* a technical term in the Roman period for the long thrusting lances of the Sarmatian cavalry and the Roman auxiliary squadrons modeled upon them.⁹⁷ We should expect Arrian's legionaries to have used the same type of weapon, a long thick wooden stock tipped with a long tapering head, which Arrian claims was annoyingly malleable.⁹⁸ Scholars, however, have been reluctant to accept this conclusion, and it is usually assumed that the legionary *κοντός* was no more than an

⁹⁴ Mommsen suggested altering *τὴν τρίτην* to *τὴν πρώτην* (in A. Eberhard's second edition of Hercher's Teubner text [Leipzig 1885] p. 1); but this produces yet another inconsistency. At *Ect.* 16 the first rank was ordered to aim at the horses' chests alone, whereas now they are told to aim at horses and riders alike, the instructions previously given to the third and fourth ranks (17).

⁹⁵ Polybius 18.30.1-4; cf. Arr. *Tact.* 12.10, with Asclepiodotus 5 and Aelian 14.

⁹⁶ Cf. Arr. *Tact.* 3.2: *δόρατα, ὡς Ἕλληνες, ἢ σαρίσσας, ὡς Μακεδόνες*. (cf. *Anab.* 1.4.1). For Arrian's use of *δόρυ* see *Anab.* 1.6.1-4.

⁹⁷ Cf. Arr. *Tact.* 4.7-9; 44.1. In the Jewish Wars the Roman cavalry had been equipped with a *κοντός ἐπιμήκης* in addition to their regular throwing spears (Jos. *Bj* 3.96). By the time of Trajan regular units of *contarii* were part of the Roman auxiliary forces (for representations see the tombstones published by J. Baradez, *Libyca* 2 [1954] 122 f, 147, plates 12, 15); an *ala I Ulpia contariorum* was stationed at Arrabona in Pannonia Superior (*CIL* III 4359-4362; J. W. Eadie, *JRS* 57 [1967] 166-167).

⁹⁸ *Ect.* 16: *οἷς δὴ <τοῖς> κοντοῖς μακρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ λεπτόν τὰ σιδήρια προήκται. Ect.* 17: *διὰ μαλακότητα τοῦ σιδήρου ἐπικαμφθέντος*.

especially heavy *pilum*, which could be thrown as well as thrust.⁹⁹ Arrian's terminology is at fault, for he twice uses wording which implies that the *κοντός* might be thrown.¹⁰⁰ The words used, *ἀκοντισμός* and *ἀκοντίζειν*, can of course denote throwing a javelin, and they are frequently used in that sense. But in the *Anabasis* Arrian also uses the noun *ἀκοντισμός* in contexts which exclude throwing, to describe the Macedonian cavalry lunging with their single lance.¹⁰¹ What is more, in the first passage of the *Ectaxis* (17) one of the instructions given to the men of the third and fourth ranks is to disable the oncoming riders, if the points of their *κοντοί* are deflected by an enemy cuirass or shield.¹⁰² Arrian is surely thinking of using the stock of the weapon as a lever to unseat the riders. Such a tactic was obviously impossible if the legionaries had already thrown their *κοντοί*. I therefore interpret *προβεβλήσθων εἰς ἀκοντισμόν* as "have their *κοντοί* couched for lunging wherever they find a mark" (the men of the first and second ranks held their *κοντοί* rigid to impale the charging horses and riders).

The second passage is more problematic; the men of the third rank are ordered *παίειν ἢ ἀκοντίζειν τοῖς κοντοῖς* (26). It would be possible to interpret this phrase "strike or stab," were it not that Arrian uses the simple verb *ἀκοντίζειν* a mere eight words after the compound *ὑπερακοντίζειν*, which undoubtedly implies throwing. In such close proximity it would be stylistically inelegant for the verbs to have substantially different meanings. It is important to notice, however, that it is the third rank alone which is given the instruction to throw (*ἀκοντίζειν*). Arrian may be envisaging a situation where a member of the front rank had stopped an enemy horse just out of range of the *κοντοί* of the third rank. A man might then use his *κοντός* as a missile to unseat the rider, but the circumstances would be unusual. The *κοντός*

⁹⁹ E.g., Schulten, *RE* XX 1336; F. Kiechle (below, n.104) 94.

¹⁰⁰ *Ect.* 17: *ἐς ἀκοντισμόν προβεβλήσθων τοὺς κοντοὺς*. *Ect.* 26: *ἀκοντίζειν τοῖς κοντοῖς*.

¹⁰¹ Cf. *Anab.* 1.2.6; 3.15.2. At *Anab.* 5.17.3 Arrian describes the Macedonian phalanx in action against the elephants of King Porus and uses the terminology *ἀκοντίζοντες* and *ἐσακοντίζοντες*. Unfortunately these words do not necessarily refer to the 12 cubit *sarisa*. The phalangites also used a lighter missile javelin, described in the vulgate story of the single combat between Corragus and Dioxippus (Diod. 17.100.6; Curt. 9.6.19–21). The blade of such a weapon has been found in a fourth-century warrior tomb at Vergina, lying alongside the metal parts of a *sarisa* (M. Andronicos, *BCH* 94 [1970] 98–101).

¹⁰² *καὶ θυρεῷ <ἢ> καταφράκτῳ θώρακι ἐμπαγέντος τοῦ κοντοῦ καὶ . . . ἐπικαμφθέντος ἀχρεῖον τὸν ἀναβάτην ποιήσοντας*. The text can hardly refer to the rear ranks throwing their *κοντοί* after the weapons of the first two ranks had stuck; that would be intolerably elliptical.

was clearly not intended primarily as a throwing weapon, and Arrian's whole defense presupposes that the first two ranks at least presented a solid fence of steel against the charge. I am assuming that the *κοντός* was a thrusting weapon resembling the Macedonian *sarisa*, although it was shorter and had a more tapering blade. The Sarmatian cavalry would have been faced with a most formidable barrier of pikes, the front row directed against the horses' chests and the inner ranks at the riders themselves. It is not surprising that Arrian had no worries about his line breaking and envisaged an immediate retreat by the enemy.¹⁰³

There is no previous record of Roman legions acting in a remotely comparable way, and we are faced with a new departure. But what exactly was this departure? Ten years ago Kiechle wrote a searching and rightly celebrated monograph on the description of Roman cavalry training methods in the *Essay on Tactics*.¹⁰⁴ It was his contention that Hadrian's reign witnessed a reintroduction of Hellenistic phalanx tactics, specifically designed to counter the heavy cavalry of the Sarmatians and Parthians. Far from a futile exercise in antiquarianism, Arrian's section on the Macedonian phalanx in his *Tactica* was a serious contribution to contemporary military theory. As Arrian shows in the *Ectaxis*, phalanx fighting was no longer a thing of the remote past but a feature of contemporary military technique. The tactics, moreover, survived the reign of Hadrian, to be used as late as the Persian campaign of Severus Alexander.¹⁰⁵ For Kiechle, then, the new tactics of the *Ectaxis* were in fact a readaptation of the infantry tactics of the Hellenistic era, not a completely new development.

The hypothesis is interesting but, I think, unacceptable. In the first place, as Kiechle admits, the tactics described in the *Ectaxis* bear little or no resemblance to the complex maneuvers of the Hellenistic phalanx.¹⁰⁶ The formation is static, carefully devised for defensive purposes alone, and the phalanx is composite comprising two different types of weapon, the pike and the javelin. By contrast the phalanx

¹⁰³ *Ect.* 27. Arrian envisages two possibilities, either an outright flight or an attempt by the enemy to circumvent the flanks. He does not seriously consider a break-through, even if he extends his line into the hills and reduces the depth of the center (*Ect.* 30).

¹⁰⁴ F. Kiechle, "Die 'Taktik' des Flavius Arrianus," *Bericht der röm.-germ. Kommission* 45 (1964) 87-129. There is a separate section (108-114) dealing with phalanx tactics in the imperial period.

¹⁰⁵ Herod. 6.5.9; cf. HA *Severus Alexander* 50.5.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Kiechle 114: "Die Phalanx, die Arrian in seiner *Ἑκταξίς κατὰ Ἀλανῶν* in Aktion schildert, unterscheidet sich erheblich von jener, die er in den ersten 32 Kapiteln seiner 'Taktik' theoretisch darstellt."

Arrian describes in the earlier part of his *Tactica* is uniformly armed with spears and *sarisae*. He lists only the Greek and Macedonian weapons, whereas in his description of cavalry weapons he is careful to describe the Roman armament as well.¹⁰⁷ The impression is given that the phalanx tactics he describes have nothing to do with the Roman army. What is more, the bulk of the material in the infantry section of the *Tactica* consists of explanation of the Hellenistic nomenclature for subdivisions of the phalanx and for the complex changes of depth and formation which were the stock-in-trade of the Hellenistic phalanx but quite impossible for the miscellaneous legionary phalanx of Arrian.¹⁰⁸ Above all it was the momentum of the charge which made the Hellenistic phalanx so formidable; this is the aspect most stressed by Polybius and by Arrian himself. The legionary phalanx, on the contrary, was for defensive purposes only.¹⁰⁹ Arrian himself stresses its limitations in the one passage of the *Tactica* where the contemporary infantry phalanx makes its appearance. One of the purposes of the close-packed phalanx (φάλαγξ πυκνοτέρα) was to stem a charge — καθάπερ πρὸς τοὺς Σαυρομάτας τε καὶ τοὺς Σκύθας χρή τάττειν.¹¹⁰ This does refer to contemporary tactics, but it is a unique reference. The offensive use of the phalanx is illustrated not from contemporary history but by Epaminondas' tactics at Leuctra and Mantinaea. We cannot explain this by Arrian's antiquarianism alone, for he goes out of his way to argue that the Roman *testudo* — a formation wholly typical of the Roman legion of classical times — was an imitation of the συνασπισμός of the Hellenistic phalanx.¹¹¹ It seems to me that the defensive use of the phalanx was the only thing Arrian saw in common between the Roman and Hellenistic military institutions. Arrian himself almost says as much. Contemporary infantry training he has described in a separate

¹⁰⁷ Arr. *Tact.* 3.2. Compare the description of cavalry armament in *Tact.* 4; 4.1–6 follows the description of Aelian (2.11–13), but there is an appendix by Arrian himself on Roman cavalry equipment (4.7–9).

¹⁰⁸ The individual phalanx maneuvers are summarized at *Tact.* 20 and described in the following chapters.

¹⁰⁹ Polybius 18.29.1; cf. Arr. *Tact.* 12.10. By contrast compare *Ect.* 29. Even in pursuit the legionary phalanx is only to be used in case the enemy wheel to the attack, serving always as a προβολή πρὸ τῶν ἱππέων.

¹¹⁰ *Tact.* 11.2. Apart from this chapter there are only four references to Roman techniques in the early part of the *Tact.* (2.2; 4.7–8; 18.3; 19.2), and none of them have to do with infantry fighting.

¹¹¹ *Tact.* 11.4–6. Arrian's description makes it clear that it was only the tightness of formation which was common to the Roman and Hellenistic maneuvers.

monograph, written for Hadrian and now unhappily lost.¹¹² His brief survey of Greek and Macedonian tactics he has included for the devoted antiquarian — ὅστις μηδὲ τούτων ἀπείρως ἐθέλοι ἔχειν (*Tact.* 32.3). Nothing could be clearer. In Arrian's eyes the contemporary relevance of Hellenistic tactics is marginal.

The infantry tactics described in the *Ectaxis* are most likely to be contemporary developments, which bore fortuitous resemblances to Hellenistic practice. In that case we must look for the date and place of origin. The legion most prominent in the engagement is XV Apollinaris, a comparative newcomer to Cappadocia. Until the middle years of Trajan's reign it had served on the Danube and participated in the Dacian Wars. Almost certainly it moved with Trajan into Armenia and served throughout the Parthian Wars. After the withdrawal it was stationed at Satala in Lesser Armenia, where it remained for centuries as a permanent garrison.¹¹³ XV Apollinaris had recent active service in Mesopotamia, where the chief problem was that of countering cavalry assaults, and the practice of using the long infantry κοντοί may well have originated there. There is some evidence that similar tactics were used against the Parthians by the indigenous peoples of the Caucasus. In A.D. 35 the Iberians with their Sarmatian auxiliaries had driven the Parthians out of Armenia. The Parthian army had consisted of light horse-archers, and they were countered by a composite force; the Sarmatian cavalry charged head-on with lances and broadswords and the Caucasian infantry added their weight in unseating the enemy: "Sarmatae omisso arcu, quo brevius valent, contis gladiisque ruerent . . . iamque et Albani Hiberique prensare, detrudere."¹¹⁴ Tacitus' language is excessively brief and rhetorical, but it resembles Arrian's projected strategy so far as the infantry dislodge and unseat the enemy cavalry. They could well have been equipped with pikes similar to those used by Arrian's legionaries. It is, then, quite possible that the defensive tactics against cavalry had been evolved for generations in the east and that Trajan adapted them for his own infantry with the same resourcefulness

¹¹² *Tact.* 32.2. Arrian is not referring to a report written for Hadrian alone (so Schwartz, *RE* II 1233; Kiechle 88), but to a separate monograph written for a wider public (note his use of *συνέγραψα*).

¹¹³ For the history of XV Apollinaris during these years see E. Ritterling, *RE* XII 1285, 1754; F. A. Lepper, *Trajan's Parthian Wars* (1948) 176–177; T. B. Mitford, *JRS* 64 (1974) 168.

¹¹⁴ Tac. *Ann.* 6.35.1–2. The use of *detrudere* is especially significant (for other examples of its use in Tacitus see *Ann.* 15.4.3; *Hist.* 4.28.3 — dislodging attackers from a parapet) and recalls Arrian's instructions at *Ect.* 17.

that he showed in other directions. This was the period of Roman imitation of the Sarmatian heavy cavalry, which resulted in units such as the *ala I Ulpia contariorum*,¹¹⁵ and the period of a strong interest in archery and improved methods of archery training.¹¹⁶ Trajan's wars were the origin and proving ground of new techniques, and the armies of Hadrian were the inheritors. When Arrian was faced with the incursion by heavy cavalry into his province, he could immediately employ the techniques developed under Trajan — the defensive wall of infantry pikes backed by a hail of *ballista* missiles and arrows from the auxiliary troops, now largely archer corps developed during the Parthian Wars.

It would be interesting to trace the survival and further development of the tactics used by Arrian, but we are at the mercy of the wretched historical tradition of the second century, and there are almost no grounds for argument. All we can say is that the units described by Arrian survived in the Cappadocian army until the time of Lucian.¹¹⁷ It is tempting to use the evidence adduced by Kiechle from Severus Alexander's Persian Wars,¹¹⁸ but that evidence is very elusive. The sources, Herodian and the *Vita Alexandri*, differ fundamentally about the details and there are no criteria for distinguishing fact from fiction.¹¹⁹ In any case the *συνασπισμός* of the Roman legionaries described by Herodian is clearly an emergency expedient *in extremis*, hardly a practiced defensive maneuver.¹²⁰ There is perhaps one piece of information in the

¹¹⁵ For the *ala I Ulpia contariorum* see note 97, above.

¹¹⁶ See the remarks of E. Gabba in *La Persia e il Mondo greco-romano* (Rome: Acc. dei Lincei 1966) 72. The reign of Trajan witnessed a great expansion in the numbers of *cohortes sagittariorum*. At least eight *cohortes Ulpiae* are known to have been formed and there were probably many more. Cf. P. Lambrechts, "Notes sur les corps d'archers au haut empire" in F. Altheim/R. Stiehl, *Die Araber in der alten Welt I* (Berlin 1964) 661–677, esp. 663–664.

¹¹⁷ Lucian *Alexander* 55.

¹¹⁸ Kiechle 110–112, citing HA *Sev. Al.* 50.5; 56.2–5; Herod. 6.5.9.

¹¹⁹ A. Jardé, *Notes critiques sur la règne de Sévère Alexandre* (Paris 1925) 76–85, argues that Herodian's account is basically correct and that of the *Historia Augusta*, particularly Alexander's speech to the senate (56–57), is seriously distorted by official propaganda. Cf. also R. Syme, *Ammianus and the Historia Augusta* (1967) 41, 45–47.

¹²⁰ Herod. 6.5.10: *εἶτε δὲ πάντες ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ συναλισθέντες καὶ τῇ τῶν ἀσπίδων προβολῇ ὥσπερ τεχνισάντες ἀπεμάχοντο ἐν σχήματι πολιορκίας*. Herodian states that the whole Roman force was wiped out, a statement which Kiechle disputes and rejects in favor of the official reports of a great victory (HA *Sev. Al.* 56.2; Zonaras 12.15; Eutropius 8.23; Orosius 7.18.7; Aur. Victor 24.2). This leads him to a paradoxical position. The whole tenor and conclusion of Herodian's narrative is dismissed except for one feature, the *συνασπισμός*. This Kiechle interprets as a regular phalanx and goes so far as to attribute the hypothetical

Vita which is independent of the encomiastic battle report and may have some basis in fact. The young emperor had his troops composed into a phalanx on the Macedonian pattern with élite bodies of argyraspids and even chrysaepids.¹²¹ If this is true, there is a precedent in the *phalanx Alexandri* which Caracalla composed from specially recruited Macedonians, and, according to the contemporary Dio, he armed them in the antique Macedonian style, *sarisae* and hide helmets included.¹²² Caracalla's motives were certainly antiquarian, the phalanx itself the product of his obsession with Alexander the Great, but the formation of such a body would have been easier if Arrian's *κοντοί* were a standard feature of legionary equipment. The transition to *sarisae* and Macedonian phalanx drill would not have been too extreme. This is only a possibility, but I think it should be taken seriously. The rudimentary phalanx tactic used for defense in Arrian's time could have been the inspiration for the serious reintroduction by Caracalla of the Hellenistic phalanx.

We have now a fair idea of the tactics Arrian planned to use in the engagement. It is unfortunate that there is no detailed description of the battle itself, but we can infer from the epitome of Dio that the fighting was not serious. The Alani merely touched upon Cappadocia and they were scared off by Arrian.¹²³ Perhaps the intense preliminary barrage had the effect Arrian had hoped for, and there was no hand-to-hand fighting. The Alani were returning from a highly successful raid upon Media, laden with plunder and the tribute from Vologaeses. At the very entrance to Cappadocia they found their way barred by a solid fence of pikes, and there was no way of turning the flanks, thanks to the steepness of the hills and Arrian's flank guard. Any attempt at frontal attack would have been met by what Arrian calls "an ineffable number of

Roman success to it. It is a strange use of sources and a strange suggestion (112) that Herodian had heard of the crucial feature of the battle but misinterpreted it and turned it into a Roman defeat, a symptom of demoralization.

¹²¹ HA *Sev. Al.* 50.5. C. R. Whittaker, *Herodian* II (Loeb 1970) 103 n.4, says that little confidence can be placed in the passage, but he gives no reasons. Given the precedent of Caracalla, however, such *imitatio Alexandri* does not seem impossible. Even the grandiose corps of *chrysoaspides* may have had some historical justification. Pollux 1.175 lists the term along with *πεζεταίροι* and *ἀγρυπνοί*, and it may have been in use during the Hellenistic period.

¹²² Dio 78.7.1-2; cf. Herod. 4.9.4. Nero had allegedly formed a *phalanx Alexandri* (Suet. *Nero* 19.2) but that was merely a pretentious title given to his newly recruited *legio I Italica*. There was no attempt to introduce Macedonian armament or tactics.

¹²³ Dio 69.15.1 (quoted at n.4).

missiles" (26). It is hardly surprising that they considered discretion the better part of valor and retired across the Caucasus with their booty.

We must finally examine the form of the *Ectaxis* and the circumstances of its composition. Some problems must remain unresolved, in particular the question whether it was written as a separate monograph or originally formed part of a longer work. Both hypotheses have been argued, equally dogmatically and equally inconclusively.¹²⁴ It is known that Arrian wrote a monograph entitled *Ἀλανική*, but the testimonia are so scanty that it is impossible to form any conclusions about contents or economy.¹²⁵ The *Ectaxis* may be an extract from it, as Jacoby thought, but if so it is a curious extract. As it stands, our *Ectaxis* is a series of commands in a skillful literary form with studied alternation between the predominant third-person imperatives and the accusative/infinitive construction. It is hard to see how it could have formed part of a larger work, except as a prebattle speech, and its length is such that its incorporation would have presented delicate problems of balance. Jacoby was of the opinion that the piece takes the form of an order of battle instead of historical narrative because there was no actual engagement with the Alani,¹²⁶ but, even so, nothing prevented Arrian from writing an account of his dispositions for battle in the sober indicative mood. The continuous imperatives remain a problem if the *Ectaxis* is interpreted as part of a larger work, and I incline, although without much confidence, to the hypothesis that it is a separate essay, a literary sidepiece like the *Periplus* to an official report to Hadrian.¹²⁷

One thing seems certain. The *Ectaxis* is a literary essay, not part of a training manual or a formal report. The style is intricate and of a piece

¹²⁴ Cf. E. Schwartz, *RE* II 1233: a sidepiece to a Latin report to Hadrian; K. Hartmann, "Flavius Arrianus und Kaiser Hadrian," *Progr. Augsburg*, 1907, 24: a separate monograph; F. Jacoby, *FGrH* II D 563: a portion of the *Ἀλανική*; Roos, *Arriani Scripta Minora* XXXI: a manual for the use of the Cappadocian army.

¹²⁵ Photius cod. 58: 17^a27 (Parthica F 1): *συγγράφεται δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ Ἀλανούς, ἣν ἐπέγραψεν Ἀλανικὴν*. Lydus *De Mag.* 3.53 (Parthica F 6) states that Arrian described the Caspian Gates in his *Ἀλανικὴ ἱστορία* (this he could have done in any context), and Procopius *De bell. Goth.* 4.14.47 f. cites Arrian's description of a town *Κοτιάδιον* on the Black Sea coast, possibly a reference to the *Ἀλανική* (Roos, *Mnemosyne* 54 [1926] 116). That is the sum total of the testimonia.

¹²⁶ Jacoby, *FGrH* II D 563.

¹²⁷ Arrian refers twice to his official report, the *Ῥωμαϊκὰ γράμματα* (*Periplus* 6.2; 10.1). Cf. G. Marengi, "Carattere e intenti del periplus di Arriano," *Athenaeum* 36 (1958) 177-192.

with Arrian's extant historical works. What is more, he writes pseudonymously, referring to himself baldly as Xenophon.¹²⁸ This is a part of the literary affectation whereby Arrian represented himself as the New Xenophon, and it is hardly likely that he would have kept up the affectation in an official document. Even in the *Periplus*, an overtly literary piece cast in the form of a letter to Hadrian, he refers to himself simply as Ἀρριανός in the dedication and confines his affectation to repeated citations of the "elder Xenophon."¹²⁹ The aims of the *Ectaxis* must be literary. The presentation, however, still remains a problem, for the string of imperatives is almost unique in Greek literature. There is one particular genre which may have given Arrian his inspiration. We know from the *Anabasis* that the historians of Alexander the Great gave detailed descriptions of the Macedonian battle order with parentheses describing the purpose of particular dispositions. These battle orders appear in the indicative in the *Anabasis*, but in Arrian's sources it may have been different. Aristobulus at any rate claimed to be reproducing the Persian order of battle at Gaugamela from Persian documents captured after the battle;¹³⁰ he may well have couched his version in the imperative. It is an interesting coincidence that the military regulations of Philip V from Amphipolis display exactly the same oscillation between accusative/infinitive and third-person imperatives that we find in the *Ectaxis*.¹³¹ The style of official orders may have been similar in Alexander's day. This is only a suggestion and, of course, unverifiable; but there is other evidence that indicates that in the *Ectaxis* Arrian was immediately influenced by the Alexander historians.

The argument rests primarily on vocabulary. As we have seen, the formation of Arrian's legionary troops resembled the Hellenistic phalanx in defense, and the terminology he uses is Hellenistic. The tight formation is a πυκνοτάτη σύγκλεισις and the front rank has its Hellenistic

¹²⁸ *Ect.* 10, 22. P. A. Stadter, "Flavius Arrianus: the New Xenophon," *GRBS* 8 (1967) 158–159, uses the references in the *Ectaxis* as proof that Arrian actually had the *cognomen* Xenophon. The epigraphic testimonia, however, seem decisive that Xenophon was never part of Arrian's official nomenclature. The name must have been assumed as a literary affectation.

¹²⁹ *Periplus* 1.1: Αὐτοκράτορι Καίσαρι Τραϊανῷ Ἀδριανῷ Σεβαστῷ Ἀρριανὸς χαίρειν. For the "elder Xenophon" see *Periplus* 12.5; 25.1.

¹³⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 3.11.3–7 = *FGrH* 139 F 17. Roos, *Arriani Scripta Minora* XXXI n.1, suggested the relevance of Aristobulus' order of battle without arguing the case in detail.

¹³¹ *Revue Archéologique* 3 (1934) 40: ἐφοδεύειν δὲ τὴν μὲν στρατηγίαν ἐκάστην κατὰ μέρος τοὺς τετράρχας ἀνευ φωτὸς καὶ τὸν συγκαθήμενον ἢ κα[θεύδον]τα φύλακα[ι] ζημούτωσαν οἱ τετράρχαι.

nomenclature (πρωτοστάται).¹³² But Arrian goes further. When he refers to units of his army and positions of rank he generally uses the contemporary Greek technical terms familiar from epigraphical sources and from authors like Josephus. There are, however, striking exceptions. When he refers to the legions, he uses none of the standard Greek translations but talks of them as *phalanges*: ἡ πεντεκαδεκάτη φάλαγξ.¹³³ This use is very rare indeed. *Phalanx* is a word widely used in both Greek and Latin to denote the entire battle line, especially when the line is closely packed,¹³⁴ but Arrian is the first to use it as a synonym of *legio*.¹³⁵ But there are parallels in the Alexander historians. Arrian occasionally refers to individual battalions of the Foot Companions of Alexander as φάλαγξ.¹³⁶ It is a rare use, even in the *Anabasis*, but it is confirmed by Latin glosses, which assert that *phalanx* was the Macedonian equivalent of the Roman *legio*.¹³⁷ It seems that Arrian has deliberately transferred a term familiar through his reading of the Alexander historians to describe his own legions and to suggest a parallel between the Roman and Macedonian armies.

There are other peculiarities of language. When he describes the battle stations of the cavalry, Arrian specifies that they are to be divided into εἵλαι and eight λόχοι (20). One of these terms is familiar; εἴλη is the standard Greek translation of *ala*, referring to the regular squadrons of auxiliary cavalry, four of which were included in Arrian's army. The

¹³² For πυκνὴ ξύγκλεισις compare *Anab.* 1.4.3; 1.6.2; 5.17.7 and the new papyrus fragment of the *Successors* (PSI 1284 = *Arriani Scripta Minora* p. 324: ὡς τὴν τε ξύγκλησιν τοῦ ξυνασπισμοῦ τῶν Μακεδόνων πυκνὴν κατεῖδεν). Note also ἀλαλάζειν τῷ Ἐνναλίῳ (*Ect.* 25; cf. *Anab.* 1.14.7); εἰς προβολὴν ἐχόντων (*Ect.* 16; cf. *Anab.* 1.6.2). There is no parallel in the *Anabasis* for πρωτοστάται, but the usage is Hellenistic (cf. Polybius 18.30.3-4; Arr. *Tact.* 6.4-6; 12.6-10).

¹³³ *Ect.* 5-6, 15.

¹³⁴ Cf. Aelian 7: τὸ ὅλον σύστημα τοῦ πλήθους τῶν λόχων φάλαγξ καλεῖται. For some typical examples see Plut. *Flaminius* 8.6; Diod. 16.3.2.

¹³⁵ The most common terms, apart from the simple transliteration λεγέων are στρατόπεδον (Dio; Polybius), τάγμα (Strabo; Josephus; Dio 71.9.3); τέλος (Appian). Cf. D. Magie, *De Romanorum iuris publici sacrique vocabulis sollemnibus in Graecum sermonem conversis* (Leipzig 1905) 117-118. See also the list of terms given by H. J. Mason, *Greek Terms for Roman Institutions* (American Studies in Papyrology 13; Toronto 1974) 163-164. Apart from Arrian, only Herodian uses φάλαγξ as a synonym of *legio* (Herod. 4.15.1-4; 7.8.11; 8.2.2).

¹³⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 1.14.1-3; 3.9.6; 5.20.3; 5.21.5. Cf. H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* I 114; F. Lammert, *RE* XIX 1645. Polyaeus 4.3.27 confirms that the usage goes back to the original Alexander historians, for he refers to the battalion of Perdicas as μίαν σπλιτῶν φάλαγγα (cp. Arr. 3.18.5).

¹³⁷ Isidore *Orig.* 9.3.46: proprie autem Macedonum phalanx, Gallorum caterva, nostra legio dicitur. Cf. Serv. *Ad Aen.* 11.92; 12.277.

λόχοι are more difficult to identify, but they look like the cavalry from the *cohortes equitatae* which Arrian commanded on this occasion.¹³⁸ λόχος is again not a regular unit of the Roman army, but it was used for the subdivisions of the ἱλαί of Alexander's Macedonian cavalry.¹³⁹ Once again Arrian may have borrowed his terminology from the Alexander historians.

Lastly we must turn to the description of the headquarter staff. This consisted partly of the regular detachments of *equites singulares*, specially trained men recruited from the auxiliary *alae*. Arrian describes them in a perfectly orthodox way as ἐπίλεκτοι ἵππεῖς.¹⁴⁰ He then mentions two hundred men from the infantry phalanx whom he calls σωματοφύλακες (22). According to Ritterling, these were the *beneficiarii* of the legate's staff.¹⁴¹ Such *beneficiarii*, however, were specially seconded to the legate and permanently attached to headquarters;¹⁴² there would seem no reason for Arrian to specify that they were drafted from the phalanx. What is more, after a lacuna Arrian mentions one hundred λογχοφόροι who were associated with him personally. Ritterling tried to identify these troops as *pedites singulares*, recruited from the auxiliary cohorts and independent of the phalanx σωματοφύλακες.¹⁴³ Against this suggestion is the minor awkwardness that λογχοφόροι is a standard term for the *beneficiarii* not the *singulares*¹⁴⁴ and the major awkwardness that in his list of officers of the headquarters staff Arrian mentions only two groups, the ἐπίλεκτοι and the σωματοφύλακες.¹⁴⁵ There is no room for a third

¹³⁸ *Ect.* 20 speaks of a division κατὰ εἶλας καὶ λόχους ὁκτώ, and then describes precisely the position of the eight λόχοι. It looks as though they were separate from the regular *alae*, and they can hardly have been anything other than the cavalry components of the *cohortes*. Now there were nine *cohortes equitatae* represented in Arrian's army (cf. n.80); the *cohors III Cyrenaica*, however, was only represented by a *vexillatio* (cf. *Ect.* 3: οἱ παρόντες), and the cavalry seem to have been grouped with a *cohors Ityraeorum* (*Ect.* 1).

¹³⁹ Cf. Arr. 3.16.11. λόχος was also a technical term for a subdivision of the Macedonian phalanx battalions (*Anab.* 2.10.2; 3.9.6; Berve I 119).

¹⁴⁰ *Ect.* 22: οἱ δὲ ἐπίλεκτοι ἵππεῖς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν Ξενοφάντα ἔστωσαν. For the terminology compare Josephus, *Bj* 3.120; 5.47.

¹⁴¹ E. Ritterling, "Eine Amtsbezeichnung der Beneficiarii consularis im Museum zu Wiesbaden," *Bonner Jahrbücher* 125 (1919) 9-37, esp. 25-26.

¹⁴² G. R. Watson, *The Roman Soldier* (1969) 85-86, following A. von Domaszewski, *Die Rangordnung des römischen Heeres*², ed. B. Dobson (1967) 29-37.

¹⁴³ On the *pedites singulares* see von Domaszewski 36-37; M. P. Speidel, *AJP* 113 (1972) 299-305.

¹⁴⁴ See, explicitly, Josephus *Bj* 3.95: φέρουσι δ' οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐπίλεκτοι πεζοὶ λόγῃν καὶ ἄσπῖδα. Cf. Ritterling (above, n.141) 25.

¹⁴⁵ *Ect.* 22: καὶ ἑκατοντάρχαι ὅσοι τοῖς ἐπὶλέκτοις ξυντεταγμένοι ἢ τῶν σωματοφυλάκων ἡγεμόνες καὶ δεκάρχαι οἱ τῶν ἐπὶλέκτων. There are three categories: (1) the cen-

group. It is surely best to suppose that the *σωματοφύλακες* were what Arrian implies, a guard of legionaries drafted from the phalanx, of whom one hundred would have been *κοντοφόροι* and one hundred *λογχοφόροι*. In the lacuna, which is of indeterminate length,¹⁴⁶ there were no doubt more specific details about Arrian's intended use of his headquarters staff. I am assuming that Arrian did not have a corps of *pedites singulares* recruited from the auxiliary foot but rather a guard of legionaries. Such an arrangement is rare but not unique. There are two known instances of *singulares* drafted from regular legionary troops.¹⁴⁷ Arrian's position in Cappadocia was unusual in that the auxiliary forces were predominantly cavalry; what infantry there was comprised largely archers. There may not have been the resources for a regular corps of auxiliary *singulares*, so that Arrian resorted to a guard drafted from his legions. This guard he describes as *σωματοφύλακες*, a word very rarely used in military contexts, except by Dio, who uses it as a synonym for the praetorians at Rome. Yet, once again, there was a corps of *σωματοφύλακες* in Alexander's army — the élite *agema* of the hypaspists, who formed the king's guard when he moved on foot.¹⁴⁸ It was a very appropriate term to transfer to Arrian's own legionary bodyguard.

No doubt the superficial similarities between Arrian's legionary infantry and Alexander's phalanx was one of the main reasons for the peculiar literary coloring of the *Ectaxis*. But Arrian's archaism goes beyond the description of his own troops. It is striking that when he refers to his enemies he names them not *Ἄλανοί* but *Σκύθαι*,¹⁴⁹ a description which is not only vague but misleading. The Alani were not Scyths proper but a branch of the Sarmatian peoples of South Russia, a fact of which Arrian was well aware, for in the *Tactica* he refers

turions of Arrian's *officium*, mounted because of their higher rank and brigaded with the *equites singulares*; (2) the centurions of the *σωματοφύλακες*; (3) the decurions of the *equites singulares*. The *σωματοφύλακες* ought logically to have been the governor's foot guard, the *pedites singulares*; such appears to have been Mommsen's opinion (Eberhard's second edition of Hercher's *Arriani Scripta Minora* XLIX).

¹⁴⁶ In the archetype, the codex Laurentianus (F), there is a gap of eight or nine letters. That may mean that precisely nine letters were illegible to the scribe, but it is more likely that a lacuna had already been noted (cf. Roos, *Scripta Minora* XXI) and the length of text missing was not known.

¹⁴⁷ *CIL* VI 3614: M. Messius M.f. Col. Pudens, singularis leg. X Fretensis; *ILS* 2364: Q. Aemilius Marinus, singularis of II Augusta.

¹⁴⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 3.17.2; 4.3.2; 4.30.3; cf. Berve I 122–123; W. W. Tarn, *Alexander The Great* II 138–141.

¹⁴⁹ *Ect.* 26, 31.

explicitly to Alani and Sarmatians.¹⁵⁰ It is true that there were confusions; Josephus, for instance, describes the Alani as a Scythian people by the Tanais.¹⁵¹ Arrian, however, had precise knowledge of the Alani and their origins, yet he refers to them inaccurately as Scyths. Once more the explanation can be found in the Alexander historians. Alexander encountered the Saca peoples of the Aral basin both in Darius' army at Gaugamela and in his own campaign in the steppes of Kazakhstan.¹⁵² On both occasions his adversaries included Massagetae, the people whom Arrian's contemporaries considered the forebears of the Alani. Now Arrian's sources refer to these Saca peoples under the generic name of Scyths, following the archaic ethnography of Hecataeus.¹⁵³ Once more it seems that the terminology of the *Ectaxis* is borrowed from the period of Alexander.

It is even possible that the example of Alexander influenced the very strategy used by Arrian. The most famous encounter between Alexander and the Saca mailed horsemen was the crossing of the river Iaxartes in 329, which Arrian described in book 4 of the *Anabasis*. That passage contains notable similarities with the *Ectaxis*. There is one possible verbal echo,¹⁵⁴ and several similarities of strategy. Both commanders rely on a battery of missiles to throw enemy horse and horsemen into confusion.¹⁵⁵ In the pursuit they both use waves of light infantry intermingled with the cavalry to hamper the maneuvers of the enemy.¹⁵⁶ In one respect Arrian may even have tried to outdo his great predecessor. Though a brilliant victory, Alexander's pursuit was inconclusive because of the extreme heat and a bout of dysentery. Arrian on the contrary arranges for an elaborate pursuit in relays to prevent his cavalry tiring.¹⁵⁷

I am not suggesting that Arrian wrote deliberate fiction or that he

¹⁵⁰ *Tact.* 4.3, 7 (ὡς Ἀλανοὶ καὶ Σαυρομάται); at *Tact.* 11.2 he refers to Sarmatians and Scyths together, and there is no reason to identify the Scyths as Alani.

¹⁵¹ Jos. *BJ* 7.244.

¹⁵² Arr. *Anab.* 3.8.3; 3.11.3, 6 (cf. Curt. 4.12.6–7); 3.13.2–4; 4.1.1; 4.3.6 ff; 16.4 — τῶν Σκυθῶν τῶν Μασσαγετῶν. Note that Dio 69.15.1 states that the Alani were of Massagetic origin.

¹⁵³ Hdt. 1.201 (εἰσὶ δὲ οἷτινες καὶ Σκυθικὸν λέγουσι τοῦτο τὸ ἔθνος εἶναι); cp. 1.216; 7.64.2.

¹⁵⁴ *Anab.* 4.4.8: ἔθθα λαμπρὰ ἥδη φυγὴ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἦν. *Ect.* 27: εἰ μὲν φυγὴ λαμπρὰ γένηται.

¹⁵⁵ *Anab.* 4.4.4–5; cf. *Ect.* 25–26.

¹⁵⁶ *Anab.* 4.4.6; cf. *Ect.* 29.

¹⁵⁷ *Anab.* 4.4.9; cf. *Ect.* 28: ὡς εἰ μὲν φυγὴ καρτερὰ κατέχοι, ἐκδέξασθαι τὴν πρώτην δῶξιν ἀκμήτοις τοῖς ἵπποις.

deliberately imitated Alexander in battle. The tactics he used had probably been evolved during Trajan's Parthian Wars, and they were determined by the troops and armament he had at his disposal. The similarities of strategy were fortuitous. They were real enough, however, and Arrian was able to draw on his knowledge of Alexander and his own previous history of Alexander to give his account of the engagement with the Alani some of the color of the great period of Macedonian conquest. He was by no means unique in this. He had at least one great exemplar — Augustus himself. One of the showpieces of that emperor's autobiography was the account of his Illyrian campaign of 35–33 B.C., which he painted in the most glowing colors, stressing his personal bravery. In the summer of 35 he had been wounded in the assault upon the inner citadel of Metulum, when a bridge collapsed under him. It was a famous episode, mentioned in all sources for the campaign,¹⁵⁸ and, not surprisingly, Augustus made it a highlight of his work. That we can infer from Appian's *Illyrike*, which at this stage is avowedly a digest of the autobiography.¹⁵⁹ What is startling, however, is that the incident unmistakably assumes the color of Alexander's attack upon the Malli town, with Augustus cast in the role of the Macedonian conqueror. The emperor, watching from a tower, noticed the assault flagging and his men discouraged.¹⁶⁰ He therefore took the offensive himself and crossed the one remaining bridge accompanied only by four officers and a few hypaspists.¹⁶¹ The rest of the army was overcome by shame and rushed

¹⁵⁸ Pliny *NH* 7.148; Suet. *Aug.* 20; Flor. 2.23; Dio 49.35.2. Cf. J. J. Wilkes *Dalmatia* (1969) 51–52, briefly noting the parallel with Alexander.

¹⁵⁹ App. *Illyr.* 14.42: ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι τοῦ δευτέρου Καίσαρος, τοῦ κληθέντος καὶ Σεβαστοῦ, παλαιότερον μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖσδε περὶ Παιόνων εἶρον κτλ. See A. Migheli, *Annali Fac. Lettere Cagliari* 21 (1953) 197–217, who argues that the entire section is a digest of the Autobiography. Cf. also W. Schmitthenner, *Historia* 7 (1958) 225–226.

¹⁶⁰ App. *Illyr.* 19.55–56; cp. Arr. *Anab.* 6.9.2. The detail about the Macedonians slacking is unique to Arrian (Curt. 9.4.32 makes the troops falter *after* Alexander took the offensive), and, since the delinquents are stated to have been Perdiccas' men, we may assume that the source of the information was Ptolemy (R. M. Errington, *CQ* 19 [1969] 237 ff.).

¹⁶¹ App. *Illyr.* 20.56–57; συνέθεον δ' αὐτῷ τῶν ἡγεμόνων Ἀγρίππας τε καὶ Ἰέρων καὶ ὁ σωματοφύλαξ Λοῦτος καὶ Οὐόλας . . . καὶ τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν ὀλίγοι. Cp. Arr. 6.9.3; Curt. 9.5.5–18; Plut. *Al.* 63.5; *De Al. fort.* 1.327 B. The number of Alexander's defenders was controversial even in antiquity (cf. Arr. 6.11.7 f), and the incident became a subject of propaganda (Errington, *CQ* 19 [1969] 235) Curtius names four defenders, of whom Leonnatus was a σωματοφύλαξ and Peucestas (agreed by all the sources to have been present) was bearer of the sacred shield of Athena. Alexander's hypaspists, moreover, were the troops most immediately involved in the storming of the Malli town (Arr. 6.9.4).

to his defense to such effect that the bridge collapsed under their weight.¹⁶² Although he sustained injuries to the leg and shoulder, he displayed himself to his men to prevent rumors that he had been killed.¹⁶³ Point for point this parallels Alexander's actions at the Malli town. Augustus could hardly represent himself trapped like Alexander in the inner citadel, but, given the smaller dimensions of the action, he made the parallel close, and no contemporary would have missed it. Like Arrian he used the Macedonian terminology; Appian describes the praetorians of his guard as *hypaspists*, a specifically Macedonian term,¹⁶⁴ and one of his four companion officers was a *σωματοφύλαξ*, like Leonnatus at the Malli town. There is no doubt that Augustus represented himself very obviously as the contemporary Alexander. The propaganda implications were clear.

Arrian's *imitatio Alexandri* is more modest. He does not model his order of battle point for point on Alexander's crossing of the Iaxartes but borrows the terminology of the Alexander historians to suggest the parallel more subtly. Part of the reason was antiquarian. Arrian was acutely conscious of his Greek background and the glories of the past. Like Aelian in the reign of Trajan he felt that Greek military science reached its acme with the Macedonian phalanx, and in the *Tactica* he placed the antique phalanx discipline alongside the training routine of the contemporary Roman cavalry.¹⁶⁵ The two types of fighting are implicitly compared but they are kept apart as fundamentally different. In the *Ectaxis*, however, contemporary and archaic terminology is fused together. Arrian's army is Roman, but its maneuvers bear the stamp of Macedon. The *Ectaxis* indeed seems the work of Arrian which expresses most fully his dual role as Greek author and Roman *vir militaris*. Arrian also emulates Alexander, and it is hardly surprising that he felt pride in his achievement against the Alani. He had protected his province from invasion, pursued the invaders into the depths of the Caucasus, and

¹⁶² App. *Illyr.* 20.57; cf. Arr. 6.9.4; Curt. 9.4.33; Diod. 17.98.6.

¹⁶³ App. *Illyr.* 20.58: ἀνέδραμε δ' ὁμῶς εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸν πύργον μετὰ τῶν συμβόλων καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἔδειξεν ἔρρωμένον, μὴ τις . . . γένοιτο θάρυβος. Cp. Arr. 6.12.2; Curt. 9.5.29–30, and Arr. 6.13.1–3; Curt. 9.6.1–2.

¹⁶⁴ The term does occur out of Macedonian contexts: e.g., Dio 75.11.3 (Severus' ὑπασπισταί); 78.26.5; 'Suda' s.v. ὑπασπιστής: τῷ δὲ Χοσρόῳ ὑπασπισταὶ καὶ δορυφόροι λ' ὑπῆρχον (a fragment of Arrian's *Parthica*?). The use in Roman contexts is extremely rare (Mason [above, n.135] does not even list the word), and the appearance of the term in Augustus' account of the attack on Metulum is very striking.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Aelian *Praef.* 3–4.

settled the affairs of the Caucasian kingdoms, now once again quiescent vassals of Rome. It was a major success, and, puny though it may have been in comparison with Alexander's conquests, it would be churlish to criticize his pride in it.

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